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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article challenges the desirability of a fundamental and longstanding
feature of bankruptcy law: the principle that a secured creditor is entitled to
receive the entire amount of its secured claim-the portion of its bankruptcy
claim that is fully backed by collateral-before any unsecured claims are
paid.' There is a widespread consensus among legal scholars and economists
that the rule of according full priority to secured claims is desirable because
it promotes economic efficiency. The analysis we offer demonstrates that,
contrary to this conventional view, the efficiency case for full priority is at best
problematic. We find that according full priority to secured claims leads to
distortions in the arrangements negotiated between commercial borrowers and
their creditors, which in turn generate a number of inefficiencies. Our analysis
indicates that these inefficiencies could be reduced or eliminated by according
only partial priority to secured claims, and that a rule of partial priority
therefore may well be superior to the rule of full priority from the perspective
of efficiency. Accordingly, the Article offers two rules of partial priority that
should be considered as possible alternatives to the rule of full priority.
In a secured transaction, the borrower gives the creditor a security interest
in specified property of the borrower that, if the borrower defaults, permits the
creditor to take possession of the property in partial or full satisfaction of the
debt.2 The practice of taking a security interest in a borrower's property,
which has ancient origins,3 continues to be widespread: Although there is no
comprehensive source of information on secured commercial lending, the
available data suggest that a substantial percentage of total U.S. business debt
is secured. In the United States, large, publicly traded firms tend not to
1. We follow the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in using the term "secured claim" to refer to the portion of
a creditor's bankruptcy claim that is fully backed by collateral and the term "unsecured claim" to refer to
the part of a creditor's claim that is not backed by any collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994). The
principle that secured claims are to be paid in full before any unsecured claims are paid is embodied in the
"adequate protection" provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, see infra note 14 and accompanying text,
and reflected in the rules of many other bankruptcy systems, see, e.g., Jochen Drukarczyk, Secured Debt,
Bankruptcy and the Creditors' Bargain Model, 11 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 203 (1991) (Germany); R.M.
Goode, Is the Law Too Favourable to Secured Creditors?, 8 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 53 (1984) (United
Kingdom and Canada). See generally INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW (Dennis Campbell
ed., 1992) (surveying insolvency laws of various countries).
2. Although the term "security interest" is often used to describe a lien against personal property and
the term "mortgage" generally refers to a lien against real property, we follow the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
in using the term "security interest" to refer to any type of consensual lien. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51) (1994).
3. See Goode, supra note 1, at 53. For a discussion of the evolution of security interests in the United
States, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1-81 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk, 25 J.
MONETARY ECON. 21, 31 (1990) (finding that, in sample of bank loans from 1977 to 1988, 27% of dollar
volume of loans were secured), John D. Leeth & Jonathan A. Scott, Tile Incidence of Secured Debt:
Evidence from the Small Business Community. 24 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 379. 379 (1989)
(reporting that 1982 Interagency Task Force on Small Business Finance study found that almost 80% of
dollar volume of large- and small-business loans were secured and that 1983 National Federation of
1996]
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borrow on a secured basis. Thus, most commercial secured debt in the United
States is issued by small and medium-sized companies.6
Under state laws governing transactions in personal and real property, a
security interest in favor of a lender becomes effective when credit is extended
and certain procedural requirements are met.7 Unless the parties agree
otherwise, the secured lender generally retains all of the baseline rights of an
unsecured creditor with respect to the borrower. That is, if the borrower
defaults on the terms of the loan agreement, the secured lender may seek to
reduce its claim to judgment, and then instruct an agent of the court to enforce
the judgment against any of the debtor's property. As a secured creditor, the
lender also enjoys two additional rights: a "repossessory right" and a state-law
"priority right."8 In the event of default, the "repossessory right" gives the
lender a qualified right to take possession of the assets covered by the security
interest without resorting to judicial process. 9 The state-law "priority right"
gives the lender a right to these assets that is generally superior to the rights
of other claimants, including purchasers, transferees, and other creditors.' 0
The state-law "priority right" is typically established when the lender
"perfects" its security interest, either by taking possession of the assets or by
Independent Business study found that 78% of total volume of small-business loans were secured). It has
been estimated that federally insured banks and savings associations, insurance companies, and finance
companies hold approximately $1.9 trillion of loans secured by real estate alone. See RONALD J. MANN,
EXPLAINING THE PATrERN OF SECURED CREDIT FROM THE GROUND UP 1-2 nn.2-4 (Business, Law, and
Economics Ctr., John M. Olin Sch. of Business, Wash. Univ. Working Paper BLE-95-10, 1995); see also
Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645, 649-50
(1992) (estimating real property mortgage debt at $3.85 trillion; automobile-backed debt at $285 billion;
and $96 billion of other debt secured by personal property).
5. James R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross-Monitoring Hypothesis, 31 J. FIN.
ECON. 25, 40 n.10 (1992).
6. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 940 (1986).
7. In the United States, the creation of security interests in personal property is governed by Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a version of which has been adopted by every state. The
creation of mortgages in real property is also governed by state law. See 3 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL
ON REAL PROPERTY 37-45 to 37-127 (Patrick J. Rohon ed., 1994).
8. Deans Baird and Jackson have used the terms "property right" and "priority right" to describe the
special rights accorded secured creditors. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 3, at 67. We prefer to use
"repossessory right" rather than "property right," in part to stay clear of the debate over whether a secured
creditor has property rights with respect to its security interest and what those rights, if any, might mean.
Compare Steven L. Harris & Charles H. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests:
Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2047-66 (1994) (taking position that secured
creditor has property interest in its security interest) with Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's
Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1952-54 (1994) (responding that property theory is not applicable to
security interests) and Jaines S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization:
A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV.
973 (1983) (arguing that, by preselecting particular property to be used in satisfying its claim, secured
creditor does not acquire property rights deserving greater constitutional protection than is accorded to
contractual rights of unsecured creditor).
9. The rules concerning the repossession of personal-property collateral, including the prohibition
against any repossession that would lead to a breach of the peace. are found in U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to 9-507
(1994).
10. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-201. 9-301. 9-312. A person who in good faith buys personal-property collateral
from another person in the business of selling goods of that kind will have rights in the collateral superior
to those of the lender. See id. § 9-307.
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filing a financing statement in the appropriate public registries." The secured
creditor can fully exercise both its "repossessory right" and its state-law
"priority right" only outside of bankruptcy.
Our focus, however, is on the rights of the secured creditor when an
insolvent debtor enters bankruptcy.' 2 Once the debtor enters bankruptcy,
bankruptcy law "stays" the secured creditor from exercising its "repossessory
right" to take possession of the collateral covered by the security interest.!3
The secured creditor's state-law "priority right" in the collateral is also
suspended. To compensate the secured creditor for the loss of its "priority
right," bankruptcy law requires generally that, by the end of the proceeding,
the creditor receive an amount equal to its secured claim. 4 In practice,
however, the compensation actually received by secured creditors is sometimes
less than the value of their secured claims at the beginning of the bankruptcy
process."
Even though secured creditors do not always receive the full value of their
secured claims in bankruptcy, they still retain a substantial advantage over
general unsecured creditors, which have a claim to only those assets that
remain after secured claims and the claims of certain priority unsecured
creditors are paid or provided for.16 The effect of this priority scheme on the
11. The requirements for the perfection of a security interest in personal property are found in id.
§§ 9-302 to 9-306.
12. Most collective insolvency proceedings take place in federal bankruptcy courts. See ELIZABETH
vARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 177 (2d ed. 1991).
However, a substantial number of firms are liquidated outside of bankruptcy, either under state insolvency
laws or without any insolvency proceedings. See Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of
the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 311, 311 (reporting that large percentage of
businesses that close and fail to pay their debts fully do not enter federal bankruptcy). Although our
analysis of the efficiency consequences of full priority applies regardless of the setting in which the
bankrupt firm is liquidated or reorganized, the analysis assumes for ease of exposition that an insolvent
debtor will (either voluntarily or involuntarily) enter bankruptcy. In Part VII, we consider the effect of the
ability of firms to liquidate outside of bankruptcy on the desirability of implementing a partial-priority rule
in bankruptcy.
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). However, the secured creditor can demand that the court lift the
"stay" if its interest in the debtor's property is not "adequately protected." See infra note 14.
14. The secured creditor's "priority right" in the collateral is, in principle, protected by the "adequate
protection" provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. These provisions require that a secured creditor whose
"repossessory right" is stayed be given "adequate protection" during the bankruptcy proceeding in the form
of either cash payments or substitute liens so that, at the end of the process, the creditor receives the full
amount of its secured claim. See id. §§ 361-364 (1994). The legislative history of these provisions makes
it clear that their purpose was to respect the secured creditor's "priority right":
Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their bargain .... Though the creditor
might not be able to retain his lien upon the specific collateral held at the time of filing, the
purpose of [the provision] is to insure that the secured creditor receives the value for which he
bargained.
S. REP,. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1978). As explained infra Section VI.C, however, the actual
treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy provides secured creditors with less than "adequate protection."
15. The erosion of the value of secured claims in the current bankruptcy system is described infra
Section VI.C.
16. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code gives full priority (over general unsecured claims) to certain unsecured
claims within the following categories: (I) postbankruptcy administrative claims, (2) claims arising after
the commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy, (3) wage and other compensation-related claims, up to
$4000 per individual, (4) employee benefit claims, (5) claims of farmers and fishermen, (6) customer
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allocation of bankruptcy value among creditors is significant. If, as is usually
the case, the business debtor is immediately or eventually liquidated, 7 general
unsecured creditors can expect to receive only a few cents on the dollar.18
Even in the relatively few cases where a business debtor successfully
reorganizes under Chapter 11,19 the mean recovery by general unsecured
creditors is typically only 200 to 30¢ on the dollar.20
The principle of according full priority to secured claims in bankruptcy is
firmly established in the law.2' And although some commentators have
questioned the fairness of permitting a debtor to encumber its assets in favor
of secured creditors at the expense of unsecured creditors, 22 the predominant
view of those who have examined full priority from an economic approach is
that it is desirable to respect the state-law "priority right" of secured creditors
to the greatest extent possible in bankruptcy.' It is this view-sometimes
claims, up to $18,000, (7) claims for alimony or child support, (8) government tax claims, and (9) claims
of the FDIC and other financial regulatory agencies. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1994). These priority claims are,
in principle, subordinated to secured claims; all other unsecured claims then share pro rata in any remaining
assets. See id. § 726(b).
17. The overwhelming majority of bankruptcies end in liquidation. See Douglas G. Baird, The
Reorganization of Closely Held Finns and the "Opt Out" Problem, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 913, 916 (1994);
James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REv. 473, 482
(1984).
18. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 12, at 311 (finding that 80% of liquidation cases studied involved
no distribution to general creditors and that in remaining cases, general creditors received, on average, 4.50
per dollar); Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Liquidation and Reorganization, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN
FINANCE E7-1, E7-34 (Dennis E. Logue ed., 1995) (reporting that, in sample of 90 small firms that
liquidated in bankruptcy, average payout rate to unsecured creditors was 4%).
19. Following a Chapter 11 reorganization, the debtor firm continues operating as an ongoing
enterprise. In exchange for their prebankruptcy claims, creditors typically receive some combination of cash,
stock, and debt in the continuing business. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON,
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 947-1129 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing reorganization
under Chapter 11).
20. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 12, at 311 (finding that average payout promised-but not
necessarily paid-to general unsecured creditors in reorganization cases was about 32o per dollar). Even
in successful Chapter I I reorganizations of large, publicly traded corporations with relatively little secured
debt, the average return to general unsecured creditors is less than 50¢ on the dollar. See Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 142 (1990). Results similar to these were found in a
recent study of Canadian bankruptcy reorganizations. See Philippe Aghion et al., Improving Bankruptcy
Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 867 n.30 (1994).
21. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 3, at 473. For a discussion of the treatment of secured claims
in other bankruptcy systems, see INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note I.
22. Scholars critical of the ease with which a debtor can issue security interests that reduce the
payment received by unsecured creditors in bankruptcy include Vern Countryman, Code Security Interests
in Bankruptcy, 75 COM. L.J. 269 (1970); Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform
Commercial Code: Confessions ofa Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605 (1981); LoPucki, supra note
8. However, these commentators' concerns about the fairness of according full priority to secured claims
did not cause them to systematically study, as we do, the inefficiencies that arise from according priority
to secured claims, or to consider either of the two alternatives to full priority that are presented in this
Article.
23. The premise of most commentators writing on the subject of secured debt, including those taking
an economic approach, has been that according full priority to secured claims is socially desirable. Much
of the scholarly work of those writing from an economic perspective has thus focused on identifying the
efficiency benefits of security interests and full priority. While there has been disagreement about the
importance of the different benefits that have been identified and the validity of the different approaches
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described as the "creditors' bargain" theory 24-that we challenge in this
Article.'
We will show that a rule according full priority to secured claims in
bankruptcy tends to reduce the efficiency of the loan arrangement negotiated
between a commercial borrower and a potentially secured creditor. That is, full
priority tends to reduce the total value captured by the borrower, the
that have been employed in this effort, the general consensus in the literature is that full priority should be
accorded to secured claims in bankruptcy. Contributions in this area include Barry E. Adler, An Equity-
Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993); Richard L. Barnes, The
Efficiency Justification for Secured Transactions: Foxes with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 KAN. L.
REV. 13 (1993); James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy
Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097 (1990); F.H. Buckley, The
Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986); David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured
Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179 (1994); Harris & Mooney, supra note 8; Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony
T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., Adding Another Piece to the Financing Puzzle: The Role of Real Property Secured Debt, 24
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 335 (1991); Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L.
REV. 2103 (1994); Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial
Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1985); Leeth & Scott, supra note 4; Saul Levmore,
Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Picker, supra
note 4; Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle]; Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of
Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Security Interests]; Alan Schwartz,
Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2073 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartz, Taking]; Alan
Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989) [hereinafter Schwartz, Theory];
Scott, supra note 6; Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV.
1067 (1989); Clifford NV. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital
Structure: Comment, 34 J. FIN. 247 (1979); Ren6 M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An Analysis of Secured Debt,
14 J. FIN. ECON. 501 (1985); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1992) [hereinafter Triantis, Secured Debt]; Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy
Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Prioriy of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990); White, supra
note 17; James J. White, The Recent Erosion of the Secured Creditor's Rights Through Cases, Rules and
Statutory Changes in Bankruptcy Law, 53 MIss. L.J. 389 (1983) [hereinafter White, Recent Erosion]; James
J. White, Work and Play in Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 2089, 2089-90 (1994); George G. Triantis,
Theoretical Observations on the Nature of Secured Debt (1989) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Stanford
Law School) [hereinafter Triantis, Theoretical Observations].
24. The term "creditors' bargain" was introduced by Dean Jackson to describe the set of bankruptcy
rules that creditors would have bargained for had they been able to negotiate among themselves ex ante.
See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE
L.J. 857, 860 (1982). Jackson argued that, in such a hypothetical bargain, creditors would agree to the set
of bankruptcy rules that were most efficient, which Jackson believed to be the set of rules giving creditors
as much of each of their nonbankruptcy entitlements as possible. The "creditors' bargain" thus became
shorthand for, among other things, the view that efficiency requires that secured claims be accorded the
same priority in bankruptcy as they are accorded under state law.
25. Both the "creditors' bargain" theory and our analysis of the treatment of secured claims in
bankruptcy focus on the division of value among creditors in bankruptcy. A similar but distinct issue is the
optimal division of bankruptcy value between creditors (as a group) and shareholders. Under the currently
prevailing rule of absolute priority, equityholders are to be paid nothing unless all creditors are paid or
provided for in full. However, the rule of absolute priority is frequently violated in practice. See, e.g.,
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate
Reorganization, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 253, 254 (1992); Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing
and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457, 1457 (1990);
Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical hvestigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J.
FIN. 747, 748 (1989); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 20, at 149. Our analysis applies whether or not
absolute priority is respected in bankruptcy. For simplicity, however, we assume throughout that
equityholders receive nothing in bankruptcy unless all creditors' claims are fully paid or provided for.
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potentially secured creditor, and all other parties affected by the arrangement,
which we assume to be the borrower's other creditors.26
Our analysis does suggest that the loan arrangement between a commercial
borrower and a potentially secured creditor under the rule of full priority would
be efficient in a hypothetical world in which the use of a security interest does
not have distributional consequences for the borrower's other creditors.
Assume that when a security interest is created, the amount owed to all other
creditors changes in such a way as to offset the impact of the transaction on
them, including the effect on them of permitting the recipient of the security
interest to have a secured claim with full priority in bankruptcy. Under these
circumstances, the creation of a security interest under full priority would
never impose a negative externality on the other creditors, and a security
interest could not, therefore, be used to divert value from these creditors.
Consequently, a security interest would be chosen only if it were efficient. In
this hypothetical world, efficiency would thus require giving full priority to the
secured claim in the event of bankruptcy
In the real world, however, the creation of a security interest under the rule
of full priority has distributional consequences. In particular, under the rule of
full priority, the creation of a security interest diverts value from creditors that
do not "adjust" the size of their claims to take into account the effect of the
loan transaction that creates the security interest, including the fact that any
security interest given to the secured creditor subordinates their unsecured
claims.
A firm will have many such "nonadjusting" creditors. The size of the
claims of any tort creditors will not take into account the existence of a
security interest encumbering the borrower's assets. Similarly, the size of
government tax and regulatory claims will be fixed by statute without regard
to the possibility that the claims may be subordinated by a secured claim in
bankruptcy. There will also be nonadjusting creditors whose claims arise out
of voluntary dealings with the borrower. Many creditors will have claims that
are simply too small to justify the cost of taking the security interest into
account when contracting with the borrower, and will thus be "rationally
uninformed" about the borrower's financial structure. Finally, any contractual
creditor that extends credit on fixed terms before a decision is made whether
to create a particular security interest, and is therefore unable to adjust its
claim to take into account the fact that the security interest is created, will be
nonadjusting with respect to that security interest.
26. We adopt the assumption standard in the bankruptcy and secured-debt literature that externalities
from arrangements between a borrower and a creditor impinge only on parties that would have claims
against the borrower in bankruptcy. The analysis we offer would also apply if these arrangements do not
systematically differ in their effects on parties that would not have such claims, or if according full priority
to secured claims on balance imposes a negative externality on these parties.
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The fact that security interests may be used to transfer value from
nonadjusting creditors under a full-priority rule means that security interests
may be used even when they give rise to inefficiencies. As our analysis will
demonstrate, the ability to use security interests to divert value from
nonadjusting creditors tends to distort the borrower's choice of contractual
arrangements with its creditors, giving rise to certain efficiency costs. In
particular, we will show that the rule of providing full priority to secured
claims may cause the use of inefficient security interests, distort the choice
between the use of security interests and covenants in loan contracts, skew
firms' investment and precaution decisions, and reduce the incentive of secured
creditors to appropriately control their borrowers' behavior.27
It should be emphasized that the analysis we offer does not assume that
the two categories of voluntary nonadjusting creditors described
above-rationally uninformed creditors with small claims and creditors that
lend before the decision regarding the security interest is made-are
"victimized" by the creation of a security interest giving another creditor a
secured claim. It would not affect our conclusion if all voluntary creditors
extended credit on terms that reflected perfectly the expected risk of loss
arising from the presence of secured claims so that, on average, no transfer of
value from these creditors occurs. Nor does our analysis depend on the
existence of tort or government claims; the problems we identify would still
occur in a world without involuntary creditors, albeit to a lesser degree. Our
analysis relies only on the fact that, with respect to every borrower, there
invariably exist nonadjusting creditors, that is, creditors that do not adjust the
size of their claims against the borrower when the borrower creates a security
27. To our knowledge, this Article provides the first systematic analysis of how full priority distorts
a debtor's choice of contractual arrangements with its creditors, leading to the efficiency costs we identify.
However, this Article is not the first to advance the argument that the rule of full priority has adverse
efficiency consequences. It has long been recognized that according full priority to secured claims may
permit inefficient projects to be financed or, under certain conditions, allow a firm to continue operating
when it should be liquidated. See John Hudson, The Case Against Secured Lending, 15 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 47 (1995) (asserting that full priority may allow firm to continue operating inefficiently); Thomas
H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the
Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 169-73 (1989) (arguing that full priority may encourage eve-of-
bankruptcy misbehavior by firm's secured creditor); Michelle J. White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy:
Me-First and Other Priority Rules, 11 BELL J. ECON. 550, 552-61 (1980) (asserting that full priority may
cause firms to overinvest or continue operating inefficiently). We will discuss these particular efficiency
problems in Section VII.A when comparing the effects of full and partial priority on the ability of firms
to finance desirable and undesirable activities. However, our analysis, unlike the analyses presented in these
articles, seeks to identify the distortions and efficiency costs that occur under full priority whether or not
the firm is in financial distress, and whether or not full priority permits inefficient projects to take place.
Jackson & Scott, supra, at 164-69, have also suggested that full priority may be inefficient if creditors
prefer that the risk of default be spread among all creditors. But see David G. Carlson. Bankruptcy Theory
and the Creditors' Bargain. 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 453, 479-91 (1992) (assessing critically Jackson and
Scott's risk-sharing theory): Mark J. Roe, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy: Bankruptcy,
Priority, and Economics," 75 VA. L. REV. 219, 220-22 (1989) (same). In contrast to our more general
analysis, which applies even under the standard assumption that commercial parties are risk-neutral, the
Jackson and Scott analysis depends on particular assumptions about the distribution of risk preferences
among creditors.
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interest in favor of another creditor. This alone is sufficient to give rise to the
inefficiencies we identify.
Accordingly, we believe that full priority is unlikely to be the most
efficient rule for allocating value between secured and unsecured creditors. We
therefore will consider as alternatives to the rule of full priority two
bankruptcy priority rules that would reduce or eliminate the inefficiencies we
identify by according only partial priority to secured claims. The first partial-
priority rule presented-the "adjustable priority rule"--would operate like the
rule of full priority, except that the bankruptcy share of each nonadjusting
creditor would be determined by treating the secured claims to which it could
not adjust as unsecured claims. The effect of this rule, which would prevent
a secured claim from subordinating the claims of any creditors that could not
adjust to it, would be to transfer some bankruptcy value from secured creditors
to nonadjusting creditors. 28 The second partial-priority rule would treat a
fixed fraction of every secured claim as an unsecured claim, rendering all
secured creditors at least partially unsecured. This rule, the "fixed-fraction
priority rule," is similar to a priority rule that was proposed in 1985 by the
German Commission on Bankruptcy Law.2 9
Neither of the partial-priority rules presented would be superior to the rule
of full priority in all respects. Any partial-priority rule would involve certain
efficiency costs and create certain enforcement challenges. However, our
preliminary analysis does suggest that the efficiency costs of a partial-priority
rule might be relatively modest and that such a rule could be effective if
implemented. Thus, there may well be a partial-priority rule that is superior to
full priority from the standpoint of efficiency.
Our analysis also considers other issues related to the adoption of a
mandatory partial-priority rule. We show that, if partial priority is preferable
to full priority, the adoption of such a rule should not be left to private
ordering. That is, borrowers should not be given the choice to opt into or out
of such a rule. We also demonstrate that a mandatory partial-priority regime
would be consistent with fundamental principles of contract law. We show that
partial priority would give the secured creditor the benefit of its bargain and
not be unfair. We also show that since the creation of a security interest in
favor of a particular creditor under full priority transfers value from
nonconsenting third parties, limiting the priority accorded to secured claims
would not violate conventional notions of freedom of contract.
The Article is organized as follows: Part II offers a simple and intuitive
explanation why the rule of full priority is problematic, and then explains why
adoption of an explicit partial-priority rule would not be as radical a step as
28. The bankruptcy share of adjusting unsecured creditors would be the same as under full priority.
See infra Part VI.
29. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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it might appear. Part I highlights an important preliminary point: The use of
a security interest gives rise to many efficiency costs and benefits that do not
depend on secured claims being accorded priority over unsecured claims in
bankruptcy. In Part IV, we demonstrate that many creditors are "nonadjusting,"
and we show that the presence of nonadjusting creditors may lead to the use
of inefficient security interests when secured claims are accorded full priority
in bankruptcy. Part V describes five types of inefficiencies-one of which is
the use of inefficient security interests-that arise under the rule of full
priority. Part VI presents the two partial-priority rules that would reduce or
eliminate these distortions. Part VII considers certain efficiency and
effectiveness objections to a rule of partial priority in bankruptcy. Part VIII
examines other considerations related to the adoption of a mandatory partial-
priority rule.
II. TOWARD RECONSIDERATION OF THE PRIORITY OF
SECURED CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
The notion that a secured creditor is entitled to recover the full value of
its collateral (up to the amount of its claim) whenever a borrower defaults on
a secured loan permeates conventional thinking about the treatment of secured
creditors in bankruptcy. The first two sections of this part therefore offer a
brief and intuitive explanation why giving a secured creditor the full value of
its collateral in bankruptcy is problematic. The third and last section then
explains why the adoption of an explicit partial-priority rule would not be as
radical a move as it might seem at first glance.
We first explain that full priority gives a borrower the power to
subordinate the bankruptcy claims of nonconsenting unsecured creditors to that
of another creditor. This stands in stark contrast to the general rule that a
borrower may not lower the bankruptcy priority ranking of a creditor without
its consent. We show that according secured claims full priority over unsecured
claims is therefore in tension-rather than in harmony-with a fundamental
principle of bankruptcy law.
Using basic economic intuition, we then explain why enabling a borrower
to give one creditor priority over other creditors without their consent might
create efficiency problems. In short, when it is possible for two parties to
divert value from a third, nonconsenting party, the two parties will have an
incentive to adopt arrangements that transfer value from the third party even
if value is lost as a result of those arrangements. Since the rule of full priority
allows a borrower and a potentially secured creditor to transfer value from
nonconsenting creditors, it gives the two parties an incentive to adopt
inefficient arrangements to accomplish that result. This is the source of the
inefficiencies that we will show arise under full priority. And it is also the
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reason why it may well be desirable to limit a borrower's ability to transfer
value in this manner by according only partial priority to secured claims.
Finally, we point out that, while adopting a rule of partial priority would
lead to a substantial change in U.S. bankruptcy law, the current bankruptcy
regime actually implements a de facto rule of partial priority: Although in
principle secured claims are entitled to full priority over unsecured claims, a
number of features of Chapter 11 reorganizations tend to erode the full priority
of secured claims. The partial-priority rules we offer as alternatives to full
priority would, of course, achieve partial priority differently than the current
regime. However, the fact that we have actually been living in a world of
partial priority for some time should help allay concerns that a rule of partial
priority would disrupt commercial lending markets.
A. The General Prohibition Against Nonconsensual Subordination
One of the most important purposes of a bankruptcy system is to allocate
the value of a bankrupt debtor's assets among its creditors. 30 To accomplish
this, rules must specify the bankruptcy entitlement of each creditor. The
allocation scheme used in the United States and in many other countries gives
ordinary creditors their pro rata share of any assets that remain after secured
(and priority unsecured) creditors are paid.31 Therefore, in the absence of
secured (or priority unsecured) creditors, ordinary creditors would share pro
rata in the debtor's assets.
A fundamental feature of bankruptcy allocation rules is that they are
mandatory.32 That is, a borrower may not circumvent the distribution rules by
subordinating or reducing one creditor's bankruptcy claim in favor of
another's. For example, under U.S. law, an ordinary unsecured creditor C1 may
not contract with the borrower for its claim to have priority in bankruptcy over
that of another ordinary unsecured creditor C2 without C2's consent.33 If the
borrower did contract with C1 for such an arrangement, the contract would be
disregarded when the borrower entered bankruptcy.34 Similarly, under U.S.
law, the borrower may not give C,'s claim de facto priority over that of C2 by
making preferential payments to C, on the eve of bankruptcy.35
30. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 4 (1986).
31. See generally INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 1 (describing allocation
rules of various countries). Pro rata sharing is, of course, only one of many possible methods for allocating
bankruptcy value. See, e.g., Schwartz, Theory, supra note 23, at 228-35 (suggesting that claims of initial
lenders should have priority in bankruptcy over claims of later creditors).
32. Thus, a borrower may not contract around the U.S. bankruptcy provisions. See Robert K.
Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 61 (1992):
Rogers. supra note 8. at 994-95.
33. See Rogers, supra note 8. at 994-95.
34. See id.
35. See I1 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
[Vol. 105: 857
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy
In order for C, to effectively subordinate C2's claim, C, must negotiate a
subordination agreement with C2 under which C2 explicitly promises to pay C,
as much of what C2 receives in bankruptcy as is necessary to make C, whole.
In fact, such subordination agreements are often negotiated between different
creditors of the same borrower. Presumably, the subordinated creditors are
compensated for such arrangements, by either the other creditors or the
borrower (through a higher interest rate). However, the critical point is that the
priority rankings of the subordinated creditors' claims are not lowered without
their consent.
While the borrower may not give C,'s claim priority over C2's with a
simple contract, under the rule of full priority it may do so in effect merely by
creating a security interest in favor of C,. It is anomalous that, by complying
with a few mechanical procedures, the borrower and C, may arrange to give
C,'s claim priority not only over C2's claim, but also over the claims of every
other ordinary unsecured creditor without any of those creditors' consent, when
the general rule is that the borrower may not give C,'s claim priority over that
of any other unsecured creditor without the latter's consent.
To be sure, there would appear to be a clear difference between a simple
contract between the borrower and C, providing priority for C,'s claim over
that of C2 and a security interest created by the borrower that leads to the same
outcome. In order for the security interest to ensure that C,'s claim has full
priority over C2's, C, generally must perfect the security interest by recording
it in a public registry.36 It therefore might be argued that a security interest
and a simple contract giving C,'s claim priority over that of C2 are not really
alike: Since the security interest is publicly registered, creditors whose
bankruptcy allocation is affected by the creation of the security interest may
learn of the security interest and adjust the terms of their arrangements with
the borrower to compensate themselves for the risk of subordination in
bankruptcy. Consequently, the argument might go, while these creditors may
not explicitly consent to subordination, they nevertheless give their implicit
consent by taking the security interest into account when contracting with the
borrower.
But to the extent that the other creditors of a borrower are unable to adjust
the terms of their arrangements when the borrower creates a security interest
subordinating their claims, the argument that these creditors implicitly consent
to subordination loses its force. And, as we will show in Part IV, many of the
creditors of a commercial borrower are likely to be nonadjusting with respect
to security interests created by the borrower. These nonadjusting creditors will
include tort creditors, whose claims are determined by judicial process without
regard to the possibility that the claims may be subordinated in bankruptcy. A
borrower's nonadjusting creditors will also include government tax and
36. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
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regulatory agencies, the claims of which cannot be adjusted because they are
fixed by statute. A borrower will also have many creditors whose claims are
so small that it simply is not practical for these creditors to attempt to learn
about the creation of a particular security interest and adjust their terms
accordingly. Finally, any unsecured creditors that extend credit on fixed terms
before a security interest is created simply do not have the opportunity to
adjust these terms when the security interest is created. When these creditors
are not able to adjust their claims against the borrower when it creates a
security interest subordinating their claims, they cannot be regarded as even
implicitly consenting to the subordination of their claims.
It should be clear that the rule of full priority creates a discontinuity
between a borrower's general inability to subordinate the claim of one
unsecured creditor to that of another and its ability, through the use of a
security interest, to transform an unsecured creditor into a secured creditor with
a claim that has priority over not one but all of the borrower's unsecured
creditors. Full priority is consequently in tension-rather than in
harmony-with an important principle of bankruptcy law-that a borrower
may not circumvent the statutory allocation scheme by changing the priority
rankings of various creditors without their consent.
B. Value Transfer and Efficiency
Having shown that according priority to secured claims in bankruptcy is
in tension with an important principle of bankruptcy law, we now turn to the
intuition that underlies much of our economic analysis: that, when two parties
are able to create a contractual arrangement that transfers value from a
nonconsenting third party, they will have an incentive to create such an
arrangement even if value is lost as a result. That is, the two parties will have
an incentive to transfer value from the nonconsenting party even if doing so
reduces the total value that is available to all three parties.
As we have explained, the general approach of bankruptcy law is to
prohibit a borrower from increasing the bankruptcy allocation of one creditor
at the expense of another creditor through nonconsensual subordination of the
other creditor's claim. To the extent that this approach is followed, the
borrower is prevented from entering into value-reducing arrangements that
merely transfer bankruptcy value from one creditor to another. From the
standpoint of efficiency, the general prohibition against nonconsensual
subordination is therefore desirable.
In contrast, full priority permits a borrower to subordinate the claims of
nonconsenting unsecured creditors. This in turn gives the borrower and the
secured creditor an incentive to use even value-reducing arrangements to
transfer value from these parties. We will show that a borrower's ability to
transfer value by using security interests may in fact cause the borrower to
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create a security interest in order to transfer bankruptcy value to the secured
creditor, even if use of the security interest would be inefficient. We will
further show that full priority may also distort the borrower's investment and
precaution decisions and reduce the secured creditor's incentive to control
inefficient behavior by the borrower after credit is extended.37
All of the above inefficiencies result from the ability of a borrower, under
full priority, to transfer value from nonconsenting unsecured creditors. To the
extent that a borrower is not permitted to transfer value from nonconsenting
creditors, it will have less of an incentive to adopt value-reducing arrangements
for that purpose, and the severity of the inefficiencies will decrease. For this
reason, a rule according only partial priority to secured claims may well be
more efficient than the rule of full priority.
C. Would Adopting a Partial-Priority Rule Be a Radical Change?
The rule of full priority is inconsistent with the general prohibition against
the nonconsensual subordination of creditors' claims and thus at odds with a
fundamental principle of bankruptcy law. Nevertheless, the principle of full
priority has a long history in U.S. bankruptcy law,38 and the notion that a
secured creditor is entitled to the full value of the collateral backing its interest
is deeply rooted in thinking about the subject. Thus, even if a partial-priority
rule appears to be desirable from the standpoint of efficiency, there might be
reluctance to adopt such a rule. There might be a concern that such a dramatic
change would disrupt credit markets. At the very least, the apparent radicalness
of partial priority might suggest that its proponents should bear a heavy burden
of persuasion.
But the adoption of a formal rule of partial priority would not in fact be
as sweeping a change as it might seem. Notwithstanding the long history of the
principle of full priority, certain features of Chapter 11 reorganizations tend
either to waste value or to enrich junior claimants at the expense of secured
creditors. 9 Since 30% of business bankruptcy proceedings begin in Chapter
11,40 secured creditors are often accorded less than full priority.4' Thus, the
37. See infra Part V.
38. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 3, at 470-73.
39. Full priority may be eroded, for example, when courts undervalue the claims of secured creditors
or when the collateral backing these claims loses value during the course of the proceeding. The current
erosion of the value of secured claims in bankruptcy is described in more detail infra Section VI.C.
40. 1995 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC 8 (Christopher M. McHugh ed., 5th ed. 1995).
41. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment
of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy,
51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 127-29 (1984); Lawrence A. Weiss, The Bankruptcy Code and Wiolations of
Absolute Priority. J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.. Summer 1991, at 71; White. Recent Erosion. supra note 23. at
402-04.
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U.S. bankruptcy system already implements a rule of de facto partial
priority.
42
Although our analysis does suggest that the existing erosion of full priority
in the United States may lead to more efficient contracting between
commercial borrowers and their creditors, the current regime achieves partial
priority in an undesirable manner.43 For example, the current erosion of
priority is ad hoc, creating unnecessary uncertainty for creditors. In contrast,
the partial-priority rules we present are designed specifically to achieve the
efficiency benefits of partial priority at the least possible cost.44
Although these partial-priority rules would operate differently from the
existing erosion of priority, the fact that we are currently living under a partial-
priority regime is useful for assessing whether an explicit partial-priority rule
may be considered as a possible alternative to the rule of full priority. At the
very least, the fact that the United States (and many other countries) in practice
do not completely respect the principle of full priority should eliminate
concerns that a partial-priority rule would necessarily disrupt commercial credit
markets.
III. THE PRIORITY-INDEPENDENT VALUE OF SECURITY INTERESTS
We have seen that full priority is actually at odds with bankruptcy law's
general prohibition against nonconsensual subordination, and that efficiency
problems are likely to arise when-as occurs under full priority-value is
transferred from nonconsenting third parties. We will now highlight a point
that will play an important role in our analysis of the efficiency consequences
of full priority: that many of the efficiency benefits and costs associated with
security interests are not connected to the priority accorded secured claims over
unsecured claims in bankruptcy.
As this part will explain, the use of a security interest confers a number
of "priority independent" efficiency benefits, most of which arise from the
security interest's ability to reduce inefficient behavior ("misbehavior") by the
borrower. However, the use of the security interest also creates certain priority-
42. The United States is not the only country that fails to completely respect the principle of full
priority in bankruptcy. Germany, for example, has recently adopted insolvency provisions modeled on
Chapter II that will also have the effect of transferring value from secured creditors to unsecured creditors.
See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. In a number of other European countries, the claims of
certain preferred creditors have long been given priority over the claims of secured creditors. For example,
in the United Kingdom and Ireland, certain unsecured creditors enjoy "superpriority" in the assets of a
debtor that are subject to a floating charge. See EUROPEAN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY 331. 355 (Harry Rajak
et al. eds., 1995) (Ireland); INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INSOLVENCY. supra note I. at 140 (United
Kingdom). In Canada, claims for payroll withholding taxes have priority over the claims of secured
creditors. See LoPucki. supra note 8, at 1922 n.133. And in France. employees' claims are given priority
over those of secured creditors. See EUROPEAN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY, supra. at 160.
43. See infra Section VI.C.
44. See infra Sections VI.A-B.
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independent efficiency costs, which may exceed these benefits. The priority-
independent value of the security interest may be more or less than the
efficiency value of a comparable set of covenants.
A. The Problem of Borrower Misbehavior
Most of the priority-independent efficiency benefits conferred by the use
of a security interest arise from its ability to reduce misbehavior by the
borrower. It is thus worth exploring why and how a firm may act inefficiently
once it receives credit.
The objective of a firm's owners-maximization of the expected return
from their investment in the firma5-does not take into account the effect of
the firm's activities on its creditors.4 6 As a result, the firm's shareholders will
be willing to pursue any activities that increase the expected value of their
interests in the firm, even if those activities increase the expected loss facing
the firm's creditors. The pursuit of such activities will be inefficient if total
value decreases as a result-that is, if the expected value of creditors' claims
decreases by more than the increase in the owners' expected returns.
Although it is by now well understood that the owners of a firm will often
have an incentive to act inefficiently once the firm borrows money,4 7 some
simple numerical examples will make this point more concrete.48 Suppose that
a firm borrows $3 million from its creditors that it promises to repay at the
end of the year.49 Once the credit has been extended, the firm's owners are
faced with a choice between two projects, one of which is "safe" and the other
of which is "risky." The safe project will yield $3.9 million by the end of the
year with certainty. The risky project will yield $4 million at the end of the
year with 95% probability and $1 million with 5% probability. Since the
expected value of the risky project is only $3.85 million,5" from the
standpoint of efficiency, it would be desirable for the owners of the firm to
pursue the safe project, which has a value of $3.9 million.
Now consider the incentives facing the firm's owners. At the end of the
year, creditors' claims must be paid before the owners are entitled to whatever
45. Although it is not necessary for our analysis, we assume for the sake of simplicity that those
controlling the firm always seek to maximize equity value.
46. Shareholders are generally indifferent to the effect of their firm's activities on its creditors because,
under the rule of limited liability, they personally need not make the firm's creditors whole if the firm is
unable to pay its delbts.
47. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 255-58,
355-57 (5th ed. 1993); Clifford NV. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis
of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979).
48. Readers familiar with the concept of borrower misbehavior may wish to proceed directly to Section
III.B.
49. For simplicity, it is assumed in all of the examples in this Article that any interest charged by
creditors is paid in one lump sum by shareholders when credit is extended.
50. The expected value of the project is simply the payoff under each contingency multiplied by the
probability of that contingency's occurring: (0.95 x $4 million) + (0.05 x $1 million) = $3.85 million.
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remains-the firm's residual value. If the owners pursue the safe project, the
residual value available to them at the end of the year will be $900,000 ($3.9
million less $3 million in principal owed creditors). Thus, the value to the
owners of pursuing the safe project would be $900,000. On the other hand, the
residual value from the risky project would be $1 million if the project
succeeds, and $0 if the project fails, providing the owners with an expected
return of $950,000. The owners will therefore choose the risky project because
its expected value to them is greater. By choosing the risky project over the
safe project, the owners reduce the expected value of the creditors' claims by
$100;000"' while increasing the expected value of their equity interests by
only $50,000. Thus, from the perspective of efficiency, the owners' choice of
the risky project is not desirable.
In general, a firm's owners will tend to prefer higher-risk, higher-return
projects since they will capture all of the additional return if the projects
succeed. In contrast, creditors as a group will generally be made worse off by
higher-risk, higher-return projects because such projects increase the likelihood
that the firm will fail and their claims will not be paid fully.5 2 This type of
misbehavior-choosing a risky project that makes creditors worse off by more
than it makes shareholders better off-is referred to as "overinvestment."53
The shareholders of a firm may also engage in another form of
misbehavior--"asset dilution"--which consists of taking assets out of the firm,
where they will be out of reach of creditors if the firm fails. 4 Although both
corporate and commercial law place some limits on the ability of a firm to
distribute value to its shareholders when the firm is insolvent,5 those
controlling the firm nevertheless retain substantial discretion in deciding
whether to transfer corporate assets to shareholders. Since a firm's creditors are
generally made worse off when assets are removed from the firm,56 asset
dilution may be inefficient.
Continuing with the previous example, suppose that the firm's owners have
chosen to pursue the risky project, which, although less efficient than the safe
project, is expected to make them better off. Recall that there is a 95% chance
that the project will yield $4 million at the end of the year and a 5% chance
that it will yield $1 million. Now assume that, at some point before the project
51. There is a 5% chance that the creditors collectively will lose $2 million if the owners pursue the
risky project.
52. See Triantis, Secured Debt. supra note 23, at 237-38.
53. See Smith & Warner, supra note 47, at 118-19.
54. See id. at 118.
55. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 593-638 (1986) (discussing limits on firm's
ability to distribute value of firm upon insolvency); Morey NV. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate
Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 432 (1986).
56. See Triantis. Secured Debt, supra note 23. at 235. The removal of assets from a firm would make
creditors worse off by reducing the incentive and ability of the firm's owners to run the firm well. thereby
increasing the likelihood of failure. Asset dilution would also hurt creditors by reducing the amount of
assets that would be available to satisfy creditors' claims in the event the firm fails.
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is completed, the owners are given the opportunity to sell $96,000 of the
firm's assets and distribute the proceeds to themselves. Assume further that the
firm must temporarily cease operating in order for the assets to be sold and
removed, causing the firm to lose $4000 in profits. As a result, the effect of
the sale and distribution would be to reduce the firm's assets at the end of the
year by $100,000, whether the risky project succeeds or fails. Thus, if the
assets are removed, the project will yield $3.9 million if it succeeds (rather
than $4 million) and $900,000 if it fails (instead of $1 million).
Since the sale and removal of the assets would reduce the value of the
firm by $100,000, and the firm's shareholders would receive only $96,000 in
cash, the asset dilution would be inefficient. However, again consider the
incentives facing the owners. If the owners remove the assets, they end up
with $96,000 in cash and equity claims worth $855,00057 (for a total value
of $951,000). If, on the other hand, they leave the assets in the firm, they
would have equity claims worth only $950,000. The owners will thus have an
incentive to engage in inefficient asset dilution. This incentive arises because
the owners, on an expected-value basis, do not bear the full cost ($100,000)
of removing the $96,000 from the firm. Since there is a 5% chance that the
firm will fail, and all of the remaining assets will be distributed to the
creditors, creditors bear an expected cost of $5000.58 Thus, the expected cost
to the shareholders of removing the $96,000 is only $95,000, making the
inefficient asset dilution worthwhile to them.
B. The Priority-Independent Benefits of Security Interests
The use of a security interest confers a number of priority-independent
efficiency benefits, mostly by reducing the ability of the borrower to engage
in the types of inefficient behavior described in Section A. These priority-
independent efficiency benefits arise from the special rights accorded to
secured creditors outside of bankruptcy: the "repossessory right" and the state-
law "priority right."
As we have explained, the "repossessory right" may permit a secured
creditor to seize the collateral from a borrower more quickly than it could as
an unsecured creditor.59 The state-law "priority right" gives the creditor
priority in the collateral that usually remains attached even if the collateral is
57. The owners will have a 95% chance of receiving $900,000. The expected value of their claim is
thus (0.95 x $900.000) or $855.000.
5S. There is a 5% chance that creditors will bear the full $100,000 cost of removing the $96.000 from
the firm.
59. However, an important limit on the secured creditor's ability to seize the collateral is that it cannot
breach the peace to do so. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1994).
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sold, transferred, or encumbered by third parties.60 Since the secured creditor
continues to have a right to seize the collateral in satisfaction of the original
borrower's debt even if the collateral has left the borrower's possession, the
state-law "priority right" renders the encumbered collateral virtually worthless
to other parties.
The state-law "priority right" and the "repossessory right" thus give
security interests the ability to:
(1) reduce overinvestment by preventing a borrower from selling or
encumbering the collateral to raise funds for an inefficient project; 61
(2) reduce inefficient asset dilution by preventing a borrower from
transferring the collateral to its shareholders, or selling or encumbering the
collateral to raise funds to transfer to its shareholders;62
(3) reduce the costs associated with default by allowing the secured
creditor to avoid judicial process in certain situations; 63
(4) reduce indirectly inefficient behavior by increasing the expected cost
to a borrower of violating covenants in the loan contract with a secured
creditor;64 and
(5) reduce the incentive of creditors to rush for assets when a borrower
begins suffering financial difficulties.
65
60. See, e.g., id. § 9-312. However, if the borrower sells the collateral in the ordinary course of his
business to a good-faith purchaser, the security interest will not remain attached when the property is
transferred to the purchaser. See id. § 9-307.
61. See Smith & Warner, supra note 47, at 127; Stulz & Johnson, supra note 23, at 513: Triantis,
Secured Debt, supra note 23, at 247.
62. See Carlson. supra note 23, at 2191; Stulz & Johnson, supra note 23. at 513; Triantis. Secured
Debt, supra note 23, at 247.
63. See Kripke, supra note 23, at 948; Leeth & Scott, supra note 4, at 381-82; Schwartz, Securiy
Interests, supra note 23, at 29 n.50.
64. The "repossessory right" reduces the cost to a secured creditor of declaring default, thereby
increasing the likelihood that the secured creditor will seek to recover the unpaid balance on the loan from
a borrower if it discovers a violation of a covenant. The "repossessory right" also allows the secured
creditor to seize the collateral and (if the borrower is too cash constrained to bid for the collateral) sell it
at a price below its value to the borrower. The increased likelihood that the secured creditor will call a
default and the possibility that the collateral will be seized and sold below its value to the borrower
together raise the expected cost to the borrower of defaulting on the covenants, thereby making compliance
more likely. See Carlson, supra note 23, at 2190; Triantis, Secured Debt. supra note 23, at 246; see also
Scott, supra note 6, at 920-21 (arguing that security interest may give financing creditors leverage to Peter
borrower from inefficient underinvestment). Some commentators have also suggested that since it may be
more costly for a borrower to default on a secured loan than on an unsecured loan, a borrower may be able
to "signal" its belief that it is unlikely to experience difficulties repaying the loan-and thereby procure
credit at a lower cost-by offering a security interest to a potential lender. See. e.g., Triantis. Theoretical
Observations, supra note 23, at 41-52.
65. A security interest in a borrower's assets giving the secured creditor a "priority right" outside of
bankruptcy makes it futile for unsecured creditors to rush for the borrower's assets at the first sign of
impending failure. See Picker. supra note 4. at 657.
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C. The Priority-Independent Costs of Security Interests
While the use of a security interest may offer some or all of the priority-
independent efficiency benefits just cited, its use also entails three types of
priority-independent efficiency costs. These costs are: (1) "contracting
costs"--including the cost of negotiating and perfecting the security interest;
(2) "enforcement costs"-the costs of policing the collateral; and, perhaps most
importantly, (3) "opportunity costs"--the costs created when the security
interest prevents the borrower from pursuing efficient activities.
The cost of drafting a security agreement that gives the secured creditor
a "repossessory right" in the collateral is trivial, but complying with the
procedural requirements necessary for the creditor to establish a "priority right"
can be quite expensive, at least with respect to personal property.66 To ensure
that the security interest is effective against third parties outside of bankruptcy,
a secured creditor is required to ascertain that the collateral is not encumbered
by any prior liens that would take priority,67 and then to "perfect" its
interest-usually either by taking possession of the collateral or by filing a
financing statement in a public registry or registries-so that the right will be
effective against future claimants. 68 The design of the public registry system
in the United States makes both of these procedures cumbersome and therefore
expensive, particularly in the case of multijurisdictional transactions.69 Indeed,
anecdotal evidence suggests that contracting costs in the United States can be
relatively high. 0
66. Acquiring priority in real property is generally cheaper, although state recordation taxes can make
recording a mortgage quite expensive in certain jurisdictions. See generally Johnson, supra note 23, at
340-47 (discussing advantages of real property as security).
67. Prior perfected security interests in personal property will generally have priority over later
perfected security interests. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1994).
68. See id. § 9-302.
69. Under the U.S. system, a prior valid lien may be filed in a state other than the one in which the
collateral is currently located. See id. § 9-103. A prior valid lien may also be filed under a name other than
the one currently used by the debtor. See id. § 9-402(7) (prior secured creditor's financing statement
remains effective for four months after debtor's name has changed). For a description of these and other
types of filings that are essentially undiscoverable under the present filing system, see Lynn M. LoPucki,
Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the Electronic Highway, LAW &
CONTEMTP. PROBS., Summer 1992, at 5, 7; Gerald T. McLaughlin, "Seek But You May Not Find": Non-
UCC Recorded, Unrecorded and Hidden Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 953, 972-93 (1985). New liens must frequently be registered in a number of
different offices (so as to ensure priority in the assets as they move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction), which
involves significant expense. See LoPucki, supra, at 16 n.64.
70. See, e.g., MANN, supra note 4, at 47-48 (reporting that transaction costs in connection with
obtaining $10 million secured loan are $75.000-$125,000 higher than transaction costs for same size
unsecured loan). Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REv. 679. 690-91 (1995)
(reporting study finding that average filing cost of secured transaction handled by large Boston law firm
was 5.52% of total legal fee, or more than $25,000 per transaction); Fred R. Bleakley, Continuing Crunch:
Many Midsized Finns Still Find That Insurers and Banks Deny Loans, WALL ST. J.. Nov. 16. 1992, at Al,
A6 (reporting that one borrower recently had to pay "10 times as much in lawyers' fees" as when it
previously borrowed from same lender to put specific collateral into new loan agreement).
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After the security interest is created and perfected, a secured creditor must
maintain the effectiveness of its interest. To ensure that the secured creditor's
"repossessory right" and state-law "priority right" remain effective, the secured
creditor must incur enforcement costs by "policing" the collateral to ensure that
the collateral retains as much value as possible; that the collateral is not
dissipated, transferred to an unknown party, or destroyed; and that the secured
creditor's claim is not subordinated to that of a future claimant.7' The cost of
policing the collateral will vary from case to case and depend largely on the
nature of the assets involved.
Finally, although a security interest may be able to reduce a borrower's
ability to engage in overinvestment, or inefficient asset dilution that would
require disposing of or encumbering the collateral, the security interest may
also prevent the borrower from undertaking certain projects or distributing
assets to its shareholders when those activities would be efficient.72 The
inability of the borrower to pursue efficient activities gives rise to the third
(and most important) efficiency cost of a security interest-opportunity cost.
The magnitude of each of these costs will of course vary from case to
case. The important point for our analysis is that there are priority-independent
efficiency costs to using a security interest, and that these costs may be greater
than the priority-independent efficiency benefits of the security interest.
D. The Relative Value of Covenants
A set of covenants73 may closely replicate the effects of, and therefore
be a substitute for, a security interest. 74 Thus, even when the priority-
independent benefits of a security interest exceed its priority-independent costs,
the priority-independent value of that security interest may still be less than the
efficiency value of a set of covenants.
71. The secured creditor may lose priority in personal-property collateral, if, for example, the filing
lapses, see U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1994), the debtor creates another security interest in the property under a
new name and the original secured creditor has not filed a new financing statement within the four-month
grace period, see id. § 9-402(7), the collateral is moved to another state and becomes subject to a new
security interest, see id. § 9-103, or a bona fide purchaser of the collateral takes it free and clear of the
security interest under state law, see id. § 9-307.
72. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 23, at 1437-39; Carlson, supra note 23, at 2190-91; Triantis,
Secured Debt, suipra note 23, at 247-48.
73. We use the term "covenant" in this Article to describe an obligation by a borrower to a creditor
that is not connected to a security interest. For example, a restriction on dividend payments would be
considered a covenant, but a contractual term in a loan agreement requiring that the borrower insure,
maintain, and allow the inspection of collateral subject to the creditor's security interest would be
considered an element of the security interest (and not a covenant). A covenant may be either negative,
such as a prohibition against undertaking specified investments or issuing dividends to shareholders, or
positive, such as a requirement that the borrower maintain a certain net worth. See Smith & Warer supra
note 23, at 247-49.
74. See Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 23, at 257. For anecdotal evidence that lenders view
covenants and security interests as substitutes, see MANN, supra note 4, at 36 n.100.
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A security interest can at most prevent a borrower from acting inefficiently
in ways that would require the sale, transfer, or pledging of the collateral. A
security interest cannot prevent a borrower from using the collateral to engage
in overinvestment, or from using other assets for that purpose.75 Nor can a
security interest prevent a borrower from inefficiently transferring other assets
to its shareholders.
In contrast, covenants can be used to control a broader range of inefficient
behavior. Covenants may be able to achieve the same effects as a security
interest by requiring that the borrower not encumber or transfer certain assets.
In addition, covenants can be used to restrict, directly or indirectly, the
borrower's investment activities, to bar the creation of certain security
interests, to limit dividend and other payments to shareholders, or even to
require the borrower to remain in the same line of business.76 Since
individual covenants can be tailored as narrowly or as broadly as is deemed
appropriate, a set of covenants may be more effective than a security interest
in preventing borrower misbehavior while generating smaller opportunity costs.
To be sure, a creditor and a borrower cannot anticipate all contingencies
when drafting covenants. Thus, covenants may fail to prevent certain
inefficient behavior. In addition, there are costs inherent in the use of any set
of covenants, and these costs may be substantial. The cost of drafting
covenants may be high if standard loan agreements are not used. Enforcement
costs may tend to be higher than when security interests are used, especially
when the borrower can easily conceal violations of the covenants.77 Finally,
since it is impossible to specify all possible contingencies in the covenants,
covenants might be overinclusive in some respects and generate opportunity
costs. 78 However, the critical point is that, even when the priority-independent
benefits of a security interest are greater than its priority-independent costs, the
priority-independent value of the security interest may be less than the
efficiency value of an appropriate set of covenants.
Having seen that a security interest may have priority-independent
efficiency benefits that are less than its priority-independent efficiency costs,
we will next examine why commercial borrowers and their creditors have an
incentive to use inefficient security interests in their arrangements when full
priority is accorded to secured claims.
75. See Buckley, supra note 23, at 1438.
76. See generally Smith & Warner, supra note 47 (describing various limitations that may be placed
on borrowers through use of bond covenants).
77. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
78. See Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 23, at 240.
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IV. THE INCENTIVE TO USE SECURITY INTERESTS
UNDER FULL PRIORITY
The purpose of this part is to show that, in the presence of nonadjusting
creditors, the parties to a loan contract may have an incentive to use an
inefficient security interest when secured claims are accorded full priority in
bankruptcy. Section IV.A begins by introducing a hypothetical borrower
("Firm") and a hypothetical creditor ("Bank"). Section IV.B shows that in an
ideal world of perfectly adjusting creditors, there is no divergence between the
privately and socially desirable arrangements of Bank and Firm under full
priority because Bank and Firm have an incentive to use a security interest if
and only if it is socially optimal to do so. As Section IV.C explains, however,
the real world contains many creditors that are not perfectly adjusting. Section
IV.D demonstrates that, in the presence of nonadjusting creditors, the privately
and socially optimal arrangements of Bank and Firm will tend to diverge, since
Bank and Firm will have an incentive to use inefficient security interests in
order to transfer value from these creditors.
A. The Loan Contract Between Firn and Creditor
The analysis that follows will focus on a hypothetical relationship between
Bank, a creditor that is in the business of lending money to commercial
borrowers, and Firm, a commercial borrower.79 We assume that the size of
the loan that Bank is considering extending to Firm is sufficiently large that
the parties will find it worthwhile to negotiate over including a security interest
and/or covenants in the loan agreement. As is standard in any loan contract,
Firm will promise payments of interest to Bank that will reflect Bank's risk of
loss and the various costs it expects to incur in connection with the loan,"O
which in turn will depend on the extent to which the parties incorporate a
security interest and covenants into the loan agreement. 8' The arrangement
negotiated between Bank and Firm will also implicitly incorporate all of the
mandatory rules that govern the relationship between commercial borrowers
and their creditors, including the rules determining the treatment of secured
claims in bankruptcy.82
79. Although our analysis focuses on the case of a hypothetical corporate borrower, it is applicable
to any entity that is engaged in commercial activity, such as a partnership, trust, or proprietorship.
80. Fischer Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 328 (1975).
81. we assume that Bank does not seek to protect itself further through arrangements with parties
other than Finn, such as by requiring guarantees from Finn's shareholders. However, it would not affect
our conclusions if Firm's shareholders and Bank negotiated such an arrangement.
82. In Part V. we assume that the option to create a security interest giving Bank full priority in
specified assets of Firm. while potentially beneficial to Bank and Finn, is not critical to the transaction.
That is, we assume that Bank will extend credit to Firm even if its secured claim does not receive full
priority in bankruptcy, although in such a case the interest rate may be higher and more covenants may be
adopted. In Part VII, we relax the assumption that the transaction will take place regardless of the priority
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From the standpoint of efficiency, the arrangement will be desirable to the
extent that it increases social wealth. Therefore, the optimal arrangement is the
one that maximizes the value captured by Firm, Bank, and all other parties
affected by the arrangement, which we assume to be Firm's other creditors.
8 3
However, Bank and Firm will have an incentive to shape the
arrangement-which may or may not include a security interest-in the
manner that maximizes their private joint gains. As we will see, in the
presence of nonadjusting creditors, the arrangement that makes them best off
is unlikely to be the socially optimal arrangement. Our aim will be to analyze
systematically the ways in which the rule of full priority for secured claims
increases the divergence between the socially desirable arrangement and the
one Bank and Firm have an incentive to adopt.
B. The Easy Case for Full Priority in a World with Perfectly
Adjusting Creditors
To isolate the factors that make the rule of full priority for secured claims
problematic from the perspective of efficiency, it is worth starting with an
analytical exercise: stipulating the assumptions under which according full
priority to secured claims would lead borrowers to issue security interests if
and only if it were socially optimal to do so. As will be shown, the
inefficiencies associated with according full priority to secured claims result
from the fact that these assumptions do not obtain in our world.
Consider a world in which the claims of all creditors other than Bank
perfectly reflect all elements of the agreement between Bank and Firm.
Imagine, for example, that all of the other claims arise subsequent to the
transaction between Bank and Firm. Suppose further that all of the other
creditors are contractual creditors that are perfectly informed about all aspects
of the contract between Bank and Firm and are able to take this information
into account in shaping their contracts with Firm.
In such a world, the arrangement between Bank and Firm could not
impose a negative externality on these other creditors, meaning that Bank and
Firm could not make these creditors worse off. Thus, Bank and Firm would
never adopt an inefficient security interest in order to divert value from other
creditors. These creditors would simply respond by raising their interest rates
to recover the value diverted, leaving Bank and Firm to bear the net efficiency
costs associated with the inefficient security interest. Nor in such a world could
the arrangement between Bank and Firm confer a positive externality on the
other creditors, making them better off, since the other creditors would reduce
rule and extend the analysis to the case in which certain loan transactions-and the activities they are
intended to finance-will not take place without full priority.
83. See supra note 26.
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the size of their claims against Firm to reflect the benefits flowing to them
from the arrangement. Thus, Bank and Firm would capture all of the benefits
of any contractual term that is desirable, and have an incentive to adopt it.
Since Bank and Firm would bear all of the net efficiency losses and enjoy
all of the net efficiency benefits of their arrangement, Bank and Firm would
find it in their interest to choose the socially optimal arrangement. The bargain
struck between Bank and Firm would therefore tend to be efficient. Thus,
according full priority to secured claims in bankruptcy could not give rise to
any inefficiencies.
C. The Presence of Nonadjusting Creditors
In the real world, in contrast to the world assumed in the previous section,
the use of a security interest giving Bank's secured claim full priority may
make Bank and Firm better off by transferring bankruptcy value from creditors
that cannot adjust the size of their claims against Firm to take into account the
existence of the security interest. And, as we will see, every commercial
borrower will have many creditors that are unable to make such adjustments.
1. Private Involuntary Creditors
It is by now a familiar point in the law review and finance literature that
according full priority to secured claims permits a firm to divert value from its
tort creditors. 84 Thus, it is natural to begin our discussion of nonadjusting
creditors by considering the case of tort creditors that have unsecured claims
against a bankrupt firm. Such claims arise when private parties are injured by
the firm, and their claims exceed the firm's insurance coverage limits at the
time the firm goes bankrupt.
Insurance companies typically impose limits on the scope and amount of
coverage under their policies. In addition, shareholders have an incentive to
underinsure because they do not reap all of the benefits of the insurance they
purchase.86 As a result, firms generally choose insurance coverage limits that
are not fully adequate.87 Thus, while a typical firm purchases insurance,88
such insurance may not cover all tort claims. If private tort claims do arise,
84. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1898-99; James H. Scott, Jr., Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and
Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J. FIN. 1, 2-3 (1977); Shupack, supra note 23, at 1094-95.
85. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman. Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liabilityfor Corporate
Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1889 (1991); LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1906-07.
86. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 85, at 1889 (noting that shareholders do not face all costs
of tort claims due to limited liability and therefore do not obtain all benefits of reducing these costs through
insurance).
87. See id. at 1890.
88. See generally David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for Insurance,
55 J. Bus. 281 (1982) (analyzing incentives for firms to buy property insurance and liability insurance in
United States).
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there is the possibility that these tort creditors will have unsecured claims
against the firm when it fails. And, while uninsured tort claims do not surface
often in bankruptcy, when they do turn up, they can be substantial.8 9
These tort creditors cannot adjust their claims to reflect the existence of
a security interest. Even if the amount of the claim is fixed after the firm
creates a security interest, so that in principle the security interest could be
taken into account in setting that amount, the size of the claim will be
determined by a court without regard to the firm's financial structure. Thus,
a firm may make tort creditors worse off by subordinating their claims to that
of a secured creditor.90
Indeed, the problem of tort creditors in bankruptcy has been attracting
considerable attention in the law review literature. 9' Some commentators have
urged that tort creditors be fully compensated when the corporate tortfeasor
goes bankrupt, either through a program of mandatory insurance or by making
shareholders liable for corporate torts.92 Others have suggested that tort
creditors be given priority over secured claims ("superpriority") in
bankruptcy.9
3
To the extent that any of these reform proposals are adopted, security
interests could not be used to subordinate the value of tort claims, and the
problem of tort creditor nonadjustment would be eliminated. But as long as tort
creditors are not fully paid or given superpriority over secured claims when a
tortfeasor firm goes bankrupt, tort creditors will continue to be nonadjusting
with respect to the creation of security interests.
94
89. See Samuel L. Bufford, What Is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 840 (1994). In two of 43 large bankruptcy reorganizations studied by LoPucki and
Whitford, tort claims-for personal injury in one case, and for patent infringement in the other-amounted
to more than two-thirds of the unsecured claims against the bankrupt company. See Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 738 nn.226-27 (1993); see also LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1906 n.81
(describing other cases in which tort liabilities of bankrupt firms were significantly in excess of applicable
insurance coverage).
90. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 85, at 1884; LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1898; Shupack,
supra note 23, at 1094-95. We assume that the injuries sustained by tort creditors, neither arise out of a
contractual relationship with the borrower nor are sustained by voluntary nonadjusting creditors. To the
extent that the tort creditors happen to be adjusting creditors, they can in principle adjust the terms of their
arrangement with the borrower to reflect the possibility that any tort claims arising out of the relationship
will be subordinated to secured claims.
91. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 85; David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort
Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565 (1991); Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor
Priority in the Secured Creditor System: Asbestos Time, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1984).
92. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 85 (proposing unlimited shareholder liability for
corporate torts); Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 54 (1986)
(proposing mandatory insurance).
93. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811. 826 (1994); Kathryn R.
Heidt, Cleaning Up Your Act: Efficiency Considerations in the Battle for the Debtor's Assets in Toxic
Waste Bankruptcies, 40 RUTGERs L. REV. 819, 851-63 (1988); Leebron. supra note 91. at 1643-49;
LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1913; Painter, supra note 91. at 1080-85.
94. It should be noted, however, that the problem of nonadjustment would not be eliminated under
a mandatory insurance system that permitted the insurer to reach the bankruptcy assets of the tortfeasor firm
as an unsecured creditor in order to recover payments made to the firm's tort victims. In such a case,
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2. Government Tax and Regulatory Claims
Although tort claims against bankrupt firms may in some cases be
substantial, on aggregate they are not as significant as the claims of the second
group of involuntary creditors: federal, state, and local government agencies
with tax and regulatory claims.95
Firms are required to make periodic payments to federal, state, and local
governments for corporate income taxes, withholding taxes on employees'
salaries, social security contributions, sales tax, property tax, excise tax, and
customs duties. When firms file for bankruptcy, at least some of these taxing
authorities will be creditors for taxes due but not paid.96 In fact, tax claims
against bankrupt firms are usually substantial, especially in the case of closely
held firms.97
In addition, the government may have environmental, pension-related, and
other nontax claims against a bankrupt firm. For example, a firm reorganizing
under Chapter 11 may terminate an underfunded pension plan and have the
government pick up the tab, giving rise to a government claim against the
firm.98 Although these claims (unlike tax claims) will not be present in every
bankruptcy, they may be substantial when they do arise.
99
The size of the government's various tax and regulatory claims are set by
statute without regard to a firm's capital structure and, in particular, without
regard to any security interests the firm may have created that subordinate
these claims to those of secured creditors. Thus, the government is
nonadjusting with respect to any security interests created by a firm. As a
result, when a firm and creditor must decide whether to create a security
interest, the firm will treat its tax and regulatory obligations to the
government-like its obligations to tort creditors-as fixed.
mandatory insurance would simply substitute one set of nonadjusting creditors (insurers) for another (tort
creditors).
95. The government may also have claims against a firm arising out of loans guaranteed by the U.S.
Small Business Administration or a similar state or federal agency. Such claims, which arise out of
voluntary transactions and in principle are therefore adjustable, are not included in the category of
"government tax and regulatory claims." It might be suggested that all claims of the federal government
arise "voluntarily" because the federal government has the power to change the bankruptcy rules to favor
itself (or to choose not to assert any claims against firms in the first instance). For our purposes, however,
it is irrelevant whether the federal government is considered a voluntary or involuntary creditor with respect
to its tax and regulatory claims.
96. See I1 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994).
97. See Baird, supra note 17, at 915. In fact, it is believed that a substantial number of bankruptcy
petitions are filed as result of tax debt. See Bufford. supra note 89, at 840.
98. See White, supra note 18. at E7-24.
99. See LoPucki, supra note 8. at 1897.
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3. Voluntary Creditors with Small Claims
We have just seen that involuntary creditors are not able to adjust the size
of their claims when a borrower creates a security interest in favor of another
creditor because their claims are fixed by law. But the fact that a creditor
voluntarily contracts with a firm does not necessarily make that creditor
adjusting with respect to any security interest created by the firm. Many of a
firm's voluntary creditors are customers,00 employees,'0 ' and trade
creditors that have relatively small claims against the firm. Even though these
creditors may sometimes, in principle, be able to take the existence of a
security interest into account in contracting with the firm, the small size of
their claims will generally make it irrational for them to do so.
The cost to any creditor of adjusting its terms with a firm to reflect
accurately its risk of loss in connection with lending to that particular firm is
likely to be substantial. Merely determining the extent of a firm's secured debt
is quite difficult.102 And even if a creditor with a small claim could
costlessly acquire information about a firm's secured debt, the creditor would
still be required to estimate the firm's likelihood of insolvency, its insolvency
value, and the extent of its unsecured debt, in order to estimate its own risk of
loss. 0 3 Finally, a creditor that had undertaken such an investigation would
face the additional cost of negotiating with the firm for specialized terms.
While at any given time the amount of credit these parties extend
collectively to a firm may be quite large, the amount that the firm owes to
each of these creditors individually-and thus the expected loss faced by each
creditor-is typically very small. As a result, the benefit to these creditors of
acquiring information and negotiating special terms with the firm each time
they extend credit would be negligible. Even trade suppliers, which are more
commercially sophisticated than employees and customers, are believed to have
neither the time nor the expertise to evaluate precisely individual firm risk."°
Although trade creditors may deny or limit credit to customers they perceive
to be especially risky, they tend to charge uniform interest rates to all of their
100. Customers may be owed money for payments made toward purchases of goods or services. For
example, ticket holders had substantial unsecured claims against Braniff Airlines when it went bankrupt.
See id. at 1897 n.41.
101. See II U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)-(4) (1994).
102. One reason for this is that although public registries identify the types of assets subject to a
security interest, they do not indicate the size of the loan secured by the collateral. See generally Douglas
G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1983) (arguing
that notice-filing system of Article 9 provides insufficient information to be of substantial assistance to
unsecured creditors).
103. While reporting services, such as Dun & Bradstreet, do compile financial information about firms.
the information provided is of limited value. The services do not report on all firms, the UCC filing
information on which they rely is itself not complete, see supra note 102, and they lack details on the
unsecured liabilities of most firms. As a result, these services are also believed by lenders to be untimely
and inaccurate. See MANN. supra note 4, at 20-21.
104. See Hudson, supra note 27, at 56; Roe, supra note 27, at 225.
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customers that purchase on credit,'0 5 indicating that when they extend credit
to a customer they do not set the interest rate to take into account the risk of
loss associated with lending to that particular customer.0 6
It is important to emphasize that the failure of creditors with small claims
to investigate and take into account a borrower's arrangements with other
creditors does not imply that they will always be undercompensated for bearing
the risk of subordination in bankruptcy. It is quite possible that trade creditors
set terms that compensate them for the average risk of loss they face in lending
to all of their customers. However, whether or not these creditors are
adequately compensated for their risk of loss is not relevant for our analysis.
Our analysis assumes only that voluntary creditors with small claims do not
adjust their terms to reflect whether or not a particular security interest has
been created, and that a commercial borrower thus does not expect to pay a
higher rate of interest to these creditors when it creates a security interest
under the rule of full priority.
The following numerical example shows how creditors with small claims
might be compensated fully for their risk of loss even though they are
nonadjusting. Suppose that our hypothetical Firm-like other businesses in
Firm's industry-has a 5% chance of failing by the end of the loan period.
Suppose further that trade suppliers typically lend $100,000 to customers such
as Firm. Finally, suppose trade creditors know that 80% of the firms in the
industry encumber all of their assets, and trade creditors receive nothing in
bankruptcy when these firms fail; and that 20% of the firms do not encumber
all of their assets, and that on average trade suppliers recover 5¢ on the dollar
when these firms fail. 0 7 The risk of loss associated with extending $100,000
of credit to a fully encumbered firm would thus be $5000 (the probability that
the firm would fail multiplied by the amount that will be lost in the event of
failure, i.e., .05 x $100,000). The average risk of loss associated with lending
that amount to other firms would be $4750 (.05 x $95,000).'08
Since there is an 80% chance that a randomly chosen firm will turn out to
have fully encumbered assets, the expected loss associated with lending
$100,000 to any firm would therefore be $4950.0I9 Thus, if trade suppliers
extended $100,000 of credit to firms without investigating their capital
105. See Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence
from Small Business Data, 49 J. FIN. 3, 23-25 (1994).
106. See Douglas G. Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 VA. L. REV. 2249, 2259 (1994);
LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1936.
107. This example is intended to reflect the fact that, in the United States, general unsecured creditors
can expect to receive nothing in bankruptcy 80% of the time and an average of 4-50 on the dollar 20%
of the time. See supra note 18.
108. The average amount lost in the event a partially encumbered firm fails is only $95,000 since a
creditor owed $100,000 would on average receive a payment of $5000 in bankruptcy.
109. In lending to a randomly chosen firm, there is an 80% chance that the risk of loss will be $5000
and a 20% chance that the risk of loss will be $4750. Thus, the expected loss is $4950 ((.80 x $5000) +
(.20 x $4750)).
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structures, they would be fully compensated for their risk of loss by charging
an interest rate that reflected an expected loss of $4950. In such a case, trade
suppliers would be undercompensated for their risk of loss by $50 in 80% of
their transactions and overcompensated for their risk of loss by $200 in 20%
of their transactions.
To see why it would not be rational for these trade suppliers to attempt to
discriminate between the two types of borrowers, suppose that the market
interest rate reflected an expected risk of loss of $4950. Assuming that a trade
supplier could costlessly find another potential customer, it might consider the
strategy of investigating the financial structure of each potential customer and
then refusing to extend credit if it determines that the customer's assets are
totally encumbered. In 80% of the potential transactions, the trade supplier
would save $50. Thus, the expected benefit to the trade supplier of conducting
each investigation would be $40 (.80 x $50). However, the transaction costs
involved in determining the extent to which a particular firm had encumbered
its assets would easily exceed the expected benefit of such an investigation.
Thus, the trade supplier-like other trade suppliers-would simply charge an
interest rate that reflected the average risk of loss of lending $100,000 to
companies like Firm.
As a result, when Firm decides whether to encumber all of its assets, it
knows that creditors with small claims will not increase the interest they
charge if it decides to do so. Like 80% of similar businesses, Firm may find
that it is worthwhile to encumber all of its assets-in part because it can
reduce its interest expense by "selling" some of the bankruptcy value that
otherwise would belong to trade suppliers of the secured creditor. In such a
case, creditors with small claims that charge Firm the average interest rate will
be undercompensated by $50 for the risk of loss associated with lending to
Firm. However, like 20% of the other businesses in the industry, Firm may
find that it is not worthwhile to encumber all of its assets-despite the fact that
by doing so it can sell bankruptcy value to a secured creditor. In such a case,
creditors charging Firm the average interest rate will be overcompensated by
$200 for the risk of loss from lending to Firm. It is therefore possible for
creditors with small claims to charge an interest rate that fully compensates
them for their risk of loss even though they do not adjust their interest rate to
take into account the creation of particular security interests.
4. Prior Voluntary Creditors
We have just seen that voluntary creditors with small claims will generally
find it rational to be nonadjusting with respect to security interests created by
their borrowers. There is another category of voluntary creditors that would be
nonadjusting with respect to particular security interests: creditors with
unsecured claims-no matter how large-that extend credit on fixed terms
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before the borrower makes a decision whether or not to create those security
interests. To the extent that the terms set by the creditors are fixed, such
creditors, no matter how commercially sophisticated, will not be able to adjust
with respect to any security interest subsequently created by the borrower.
One might wonder why unsecured creditors simply do not prohibit
borrowers from subsequently issuing secured debt through the use of negative
pledge covenants-covenants that severely restrict the ability of a borrower to
issue secured debt."0 Indeed, we will see that sophisticated creditors
frequently negotiate such covenants."' Nevertheless, there are many
situations in which a negative pledge covenant will not be used even if the
borrower is likely to issue an inefficient security interest.
First, an unsecured lender might not be willing to offer a lower interest
rate in exchange for a negative pledge covenant from a borrower if the
transactions of that borrower may be difficult to monitor. Consider the case of
an unsecured creditor lending to the typical U.S. firm-a small or medium-
sized privately held company. If the firm experiences severe financial
problems," 2 even otherwise honest owner-managers will have a strong
incentive to violate covenants if they believe such actions are necessary to
keep the firm alive." 3 The owners may thus disregard a negative pledge
covenant and have their company borrow from family, friends, or business
associates on a secured basis. Since the "informal" creditor need not perfect
its security interest for its claim to have priority over that of the unsecured
lender,' "4 there is little risk that the unsecured creditor will discover the
borrowing." 5 When it eventually discovers the breach, the unsecured
creditor's only recourse will generally be to call a default, sue for repayment,
and then begin the lengthy judicial process required before the creditor can
attempt to satisfy its debt by seizing whatever is left of the company's assets
110. The creditor could achieve effects similar to that of a negative pledge covenant by including a
"due-on-encumbrance" clause-a clause requiring that the loan be repaid if the borrower issues secured
debt-or by a provision requiring the borrower to pay a prohibitive penalty for issuing secured debt
(through a much higher interest rate, or otherwise). The analysis of negative pledge covenants that follows
thus generally applies to these types of provisions as well.
11. See infra Section VII.B.
112. Smaller firms are more likely to experience financial distress and fail than are larger firms. See
Leeth & Scott, supra note 4, at 383.
113. See Adler, supra note 23, at 80; Scott, supra note 6, at 946.
114. See U.C.C. § 9-201 (1994); id. 9-301.
115. See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1928 n.157; Schwartz, Theory, supra note 23, at 244-45. Indeed,
there is anecdotal evidence that unsecured lenders believe that it is too expensive to perform UCC searches
routinely in order to learn whether security interests have been perfected in the assets of their borrowers.
See MANN, supra note 4, at 20. Thus. the "informal creditor" may even be able to perfect its security
interest without discovery by the negative pledge covenant borrower. In contrast, an unsecured creditor
lending to a publicly traded firm would quickly learn of such borrowing, since federal law would require
the managers of such a firm to disclose any material, privately arranged loan in its next periodic report to
the SEC. See Adler, supra note 23, at 92 n.73.
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after the "informal" creditor has been paid." 6 The process of getting a
judgment-which must be obtained before the creditor can seize the firm's
assets-may take months or even years. 117 If aft unsecured creditor believes
a negative pledge covenant is not enforceable, it will simply set its interest rate
to reflect the fact that the firm may later create security interests, thereby
subordinating its claim; the firm will then be free to create security interests,
even if they are inefficient.
Another reason why a negative pledge covenant may not be used is that
the unsecured creditor can never capture all of its benefits. Consider the case
of an unsecured creditor lending to a borrower that has nonadjusting creditors.
As we will see in Part VII, a portion of the benefits of any negative pledge
covenant negotiated by a creditor and a borrower flow to nonadjusting
creditors and thus are not captured by the contracting parties." 8 Since the
unsecured creditor and the borrower would bear all of the costs but not enjoy
all of the benefits, it would not be in their interest to adopt a negative pledge
covenant if their share of the benefits was less than the costs associated with
the covenant, even if the total benefits of the covenant would exceed those
costs. Thus, there are situations where a negative pledge covenant is not
adopted, even if it would be both enforceable and efficient.
Finally, a negative pledge covenant may not be used because it is
overbroad. Consider the case of an unsecured creditor lending to a borrower
that anticipates issuing both efficient and inefficient security interests. It would
not be in the interest of such a borrower to issue a negative pledge covenant
if the cost to the borrower of preventing the creation of efficient security
interests would exceed the benefit that accrues to it from preventing the
creation of inefficient security interests. In such a case, even if the negative
pledge covenant were enforceable and all of the costs and benefits associated
with the covenant flowed to the creditor and the borrower, it would not be in
the interest of the borrower to issue it.
One might question why a sophisticated unsecured creditor not protected
by a negative pledge covenant would lend on fixed terms when there is a
possibility that the borrower will subsequently issue secured debt subordinating
its claim. In principle, the creditor could build an adjustment mechanism into
its contracts that would require the borrower to compensate it for its increased
risk of loss every time the borrower issues a security interest. Such an
adjustment mechanism would permit the borrower to create a security interest
transferring value from nonadjusting creditors as long as the sophisticated
116. The security interest of the informal creditor will generally give it priority over the unsecured
lender. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Imbesi. 412 A.2d 96 (Md. 1980) (holding that mortgagee had priority
in property encumbered by borrower in violation of covenant); MANN, supra note 4. at 20.
117. See LoPucki, supra note 8. at 1935 n.175.
118. See infra Section VII.B.
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creditor is compensated. Thus, an adjustment mechanism might be more likely
to be adopted than a negative pledge covenant.
Although some sophigticated creditors may attempt to build such
mechanisms into their loan contracts, such arrangements are generally not
practical."9 The appropriate adjustment factor for each security interest
would depend on numerous parameters, such as the likelihood of the
borrower's insolvency. Bargaining over the size of the adjustment factor each
time the borrower created a security interest would be expensive. And since
many of the relevant parameters would be realized only at the time the security
interest is created, it would be extremely difficult to specify the appropriate
schedule of adjustments in advance. 20
Moreover, such a contractual provision-like a negative pledge
covenant-might be difficult to enforce against smaller companies. Since such
companies are easily able to conceal financing transactions, it may take time
for an adjustment-clause creditor to learn of the creation of a security
interest. 12' In addition, the company may lack the funds to pay the adjusted
rate once the transaction is discovered. Thus, even if an appropriate adjustment
schedule could be costlessly specified in advance, there would be situations
where a sophisticated creditor would not reduce the interest rate it charged a
borrower in exchange for such an adjustment mechanism.
In short, there will be situations where even a sophisticated creditor
extending a significant amount of credit will neither bargain for a negative
pledge covenant nor incorporate an adjustment mechanism into the loan
contract. In such cases, the creditor will not be able to adjust to the subsequent
creation of a security interest by the borrower. When the borrower considers
creating a security interest, it will thus treat the claims of these prior
creditors-like the claims of every other nonadjusting creditor-as fixed.
It should again be emphasized that, although certain prior voluntary
creditors may be nonadjusting, we are not assuming that they are
undercompensated for the extra risk of loss caused by security interests through
the subordination of their bankruptcy claim. For purposes of our analysis, we
are willing to assume that prior creditors anticipate the risk that subsequent
security interests will subordinate their claims in bankruptcy and charge
accordingly. 22 The only assumption on which our analysis depends is that
119. See, e.g., Kanda & Levmore, supra note 23, at 2112 (describing high transaction costs of
variable-interest-rate arrangements).
120. To be sure, the parties need not get the adjustment factors exactly right for the mechanism to be
somewhat effective. But to the extent the adjustment factors are too low, the borrower will still have an
incentive to create inefficient security interests that divert value from the unsecured creditor and reduce the
joint wealth of the two parties. And to the extent the adjustment factors are too high, the borrower will be
prevented from creating security interests that would increase the joint wealth of the two parties. Thus,
there would be a cost to the parties from adopting an inaccurate adjustment mechanism (in addition to the
costs of contracting for such an arrangement).
121. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
122. See supra Subsection IV.C.3.
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the terms negotiated by almost all prior creditors, however set, are fixed before
the borrower and a potentially secured creditor negotiate their loan transaction.
Thus, when the borrower and the potentially secured creditor shape their
arrangement, the use of a security interest giving the creditor a secured claim
with full priority may make the borrower better off by allowing it to "sell" to
the creditor bankruptcy value that would otherwise be enjoyed by these prior
nonadjusting creditors.
D. Full Priority and the Decision to Create a Security Interest
We are now ready to consider how, under the rule of full priority, the
presence of nonadjusting creditors affects the borrower's and a potentially
secured creditor's decision about whether to create a security interest. To that
end, we provide an extended numerical example that will illustrate the effect
of full priority on the arrangement chosen by the borrower and the creditor.
Suppose that Firm is negotiating with Bank for a $1 million loan. Assume
that two nonadjusting creditors each have already extended $500,000 of
unsecured credit to Firm, and that one adjusting creditor will extend another
$1 million of unsecured credit to Firm after the transaction with Bank is
completed.'23 Assume further that Firm has three assets that it could offer
Bank as collateral, and that, if Firm does not encumber any of the assets in
favor of Bank, $450,000 of assets would be available to satisfy creditors'
claims in the event of default. Finally, suppose that, whether or not Firm
provides any of these assets to Bank as collateral, the probability that Firm will
fail by the end of the year is 5%.
Suppose that if Firm encumbers the first asset-which is expected to have
a value of $400,000 in the event of bankruptcy-the amount of bankruptcy
assets available to the creditors as a group would increase from $450,000 to
$660,000. Assume also that encumbering the first asset would cost Bank $2000
in contracting costs and reduce shareholders' ability to enrich themselves
through asset dilution by $7500. On these assumptions, encumbering the first
asset would increase the value of creditors' claims (including Bank's) by
$10,500124 while imposing $9500 of costs on Bank and Firm, leading to an
efficiency gain of $1000.
Suppose that, once Firm has encumbered the first asset, the effect of
encumbering the second asset-which is expected to have a value of $200,000
in bankruptcy-would be to increase the amount of assets available in the
event of bankruptcy to $720,000. Assume that encumbering the second asset
123. For convenience, we continue to assume in our numerical examples that shareholders make all
interest payments to creditors at the time credit is extended.
124. The increase in the value of creditors' claims is equal to the probability of bankruptcy (5%)
multiplied by the increase in the amount of assets that will be available to creditors in that event
($660,000 - $450,000 = $210,000). or $10,500.
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would cost Bank an additional $1000 in contracting costs while reducing the
shareholders' ability to engage in asset dilution by an additional $1000. In such
a case, the effect of including the second asset in Bank's security interest
would increase the value of all of the creditors' claims by $3000 1 s while
imposing $2000 of costs on Bank and Firm, leading to a further efficiency gain
of $1000.
Finally, suppose that, once Firm has encumbered the first two assets,
encumbering the third asset-which is expected to have a value of $120,000
in bankruptcy-would have no effect on the total value of assets available to
creditors in the event of bankruptcy. In other words, the third asset would be
available to satisfy creditors' claims in bankruptcy whether or not it is
encumbered as collateral for Bank's loan. Assume that including the third asset
in the security interest would cost Bank an additional $1000 in contracting
costs (but impose no costs on Firm's shareholders). Thus, encumbering the
third asset would lead to an efficiency loss of $1000.
Let us now consider the incentives faced by Firm under the rule of full
priority. If Firm does not encumber any of the assets, Bank and the adjusting
creditor would receive $150,000 each, and the two nonadjusting creditors
would receive $75,000 each in the event of bankruptcy. 126 By pledging the
first asset to Bank, Firm would increase Bank's share of bankruptcy assets
from $150,000 to $460,000 while reducing the adjusting creditor's share of
bankruptcy assets from $150,000 to $100,000.127 Since taking a security
interest in the first asset would cost Bank $2000 in contracting costs but
reduce its risk of loss on the loan by $15,500,128 Bank would charge Firm
$13,500 less in interest if the first asset were provided as collateral. However,
the adjusting creditor would charge $2500 more in interest,129 so that the net
125. The increase in the value of creditors' claim is equal to the probability of bankruptcy (5%)
multiplied by the increase in the amount of assets that will be available to creditors in that event
($720,000 - $660,000 = $60,000), or $3000.
126. Recall that if Finn does not create a security interest in favor of Bank, $450,000 would be
available in the event of bankruptcy to satisfy creditors' claims. Bank and the adjusting creditor would be
owed $1 million each, and the two nonadjusting creditors would be owed $500,000 each by Finn, for a
total of $3 million in liabilities. The payout rate for unsecured claims would thus be ($450,000/$3 million),
or 15¢ on the dollar. With no security interest, Bank would thus lose $850,000 in the event of bankruptcy.
127. Under the rule of full priority, if Finn encumbers the first asset, Bank would have a secured claim
in bankruptcy for $400,000 (the expected value of the first asset) and an unsecured claim for $600,000 (the
balance of the $1 million owed Bank). Bank's $600,000 unsecured claim would share pro rata with the $2
million of other unsecured claims in the $260,000 of assets that remain after Bank's $400.000 secured
claim is paid. Unsecured claims would therefore be paid 10¢ on the dollar. Bank would receive $60.000
for its unsecured claim (for a total bankruptcy payment of $460,000), and the adjusting creditor would
receive $100,000 for its unsecured claim. with a security interest in the first asset, Bank would thus lose
$540,000 in the event of bankruptcy.
128. In the absence of a security interest. Bank would lose $850.000 in the event of bankruptcy. See
supra note 126. If the first asset were provided to Bank as collateral. Bank would lose only $540.000 in
the event of bankruptcy. See supra note 127. Thus, encumbering the first asset would reduce Bank's
expected loss by $15,000 ((.05 x $850,000) - (.05 x $540,000)).
129. If there is no security interest, the adjusting creditor would lose $850,000 in the event of
bankruptcy. See supra note 126. If the first asset is given to Bank as collateral, the adjusting creditor would
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reduction in interest faced by Firm would be only $11,000. Since pledging the
first asset to Bank would reduce shareholders' ability to enrich themselves
through asset dilution by only $7500, Firm would have an incentive to provide
the first asset as collateral.
If Firm provides the second asset as collateral (in addition to the first),
Bank's share of bankruptcy assets would increase from $460,000 to $620,000,
and the adjusting creditor's share of bankruptcy assets would decrease from
$100,000 to $50,000.130 Since encumbering the second asset would cost Bank
$1000 in contracting costs but reduce its risk of loss on the loan by $8000, 3,
Bank would charge Firm $7000 less interest if the second asset were also
provided as collateral. However, the adjusting creditor would charge another
$2500 in interest, t32 so that the net reduction in interest faced by Firm would
be $4500. Since the effect of pledging the second asset would be to reduce the
ability of shareholders to engage in asset dilution by only an additional $1000,
Firm would have an incentive to encumber the second asset.
Finally, if Firm also offers the third asset as collateral, Bank's share of
bankruptcy assets would increase from $620,000 to $720,000, and the adjusting
creditor's share would decrease from $50,000 to zero. Since encumbering the
third asset would cost Bank an additional $1000 in contracting costs while
reducing its risk of loss by $5000, Bank would be willing to charge Firm
$4000 less in interest if the third asset is also provided as collateral.
Encumbering the third asset would cause the adjusting creditor to charge
another $2500 in interest. Thus, even though encumbering the third asset
would be inefficient, Firm would have an incentive to do so under the rule of
full priority.133
The reason Firm is better off inefficiently pledging the third asset is that
nonadjusting creditors will not raise their interest rates to take into account the
effect of encumbering that asset on them. The pledging of each asset reduces
the payment to unsecured claims by 5¢ on the dollar. Thus, the value of the
nonadjusting creditors' claims is reduced by $2500 each time an asset is
encumbered.13 4 Since the pledging of each asset reduces the value of the two
lose $900,000 in the event of bankruptcy. See supra note 127. Thus, encumbering the first asset would
increase the adjusting creditor's expected loss by $2500 ((.05 x $900,000) - (.05 x $850,000)).
130. Under the rule of full priority, Bank would have a secured claim for $600,000 (representing the
combined value of the two encumbered assets) and an unsecured claim for $400,000. Bank's unsecured
claim would share pro rata with the $2 million of other unsecured claims in the $120,000 that would remain
after Bank's $600,000 secured claim is paid. Unsecured claims would thus be paid 5o on the dollar. As
a result, Bank would receive $20,000 on its unsecured claim (for a total of $620,000), and the adjusting
creditor would receive $50,000 on its $1 million unsecured claim.
131. Bank's expected loss would decrease by $8,000 ((.05 x $540,000) - (.05 x $380,000)).
132. The adjusting creditor's expected loss would increase by $2500 ((.05 x $950,000) - (.05 x
$900,000)).
133. By encumbering the third asset, Firm would reduce the interest charged by Bank and the
adjusting creditor by $1500 ($4000 - $2500).
134. Each time an asset is encumbered, the payment to unsecured claims is reduced by 5¢ on the
dollar. Since the nonadjusting creditors are owed $1 million, their combined bankruptcy share is reduced
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nonadjusting creditors' claims by a total of $2500, the creation of the security
interest in the three assets would transfer $7500 of value from these creditors
to Firm.
Let us now consider whether the nonadjusting creditors are actually "hurt"
by the creation of the security interest in the three assets. We will examine
four cases. First, consider the case in which all of the nonadjusting creditors
are involuntary creditors (such as tort creditors). Since the involuntary creditors
do not have the opportunity to set the size of their claims to reflect the
possibility of this $7500 transfer, they would actually be "hurt" by the creation
of the security interest in the three assets.
The second case to be considered is one in which all of the nonadjusting
creditors are voluntary creditors whose claims against Firm are small. 35 As
explained, creditors with small claims, such as trade suppliers, may set their
interest rates to reflect the average risk of loss from lending to businesses such
as Firm. In such a case, they will not be "hurt" on average by extending credit
to businesses like Firm. 36 However, the interest rate charged a particular
business may not compensate these creditors for their risk of loss. If the
interest charged Firm does not compensate them for their risk when Firm
encumbers all three assets, the creation of the security interest in the three
assets will "hurt" these creditors.
The third case is one in which all of the nonadjusting creditors are
sophisticated and have large claims against Firm. Let us assume, for example,
that the nonadjusting creditors are insurance companies that extend credit to
Firm before its transaction with Bank. If these insurance companies believe at
the time they extend credit to Firm that Firm is likely to encumber all three
assets, the insurers will choose terms that compensate them for the anticipated
transfer of $7500. When Bank and Firm later negotiate their loan contract,
Firm will encumber all three assets as expected by the insurance companies.
Because the insurers will be compensated for subordination by the higher
interest rate paid by Firm, they will not be "hurt" by the creation of the
security interests. Thus, when all of Firm's nonadjusting creditors are voluntary
and well informed, the efficiency costs arising from the anticipated
encumbering of the third asset will be borne entirely by Firm's equityholders
when they pay interest to these creditors.
In the case in which all of a firm's nonadjusting creditors are voluntary
and well informed, one might think that a firm would be better off contracting
in advance not to inefficiently encumber any asset. However, such a
$50,000 each time an asset is encumbered, increasing their expected loss by $2500 (.05 x $50.000). As
there is a 5% chance of bankruptcy, the expected value of these creditors' claims is thus reduced by $2500
(.05 x $50,000) every time an asset is encumbered.
135. Assume that the two nonadjusting creditors owed $500,000 each are instead 20 nonadjusting trade
creditors each owed $50,000.
136. See supra Subsection IV.C.3.
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commitment would require that the firm know in advance that it would be
inefficient to encumber particular assets. Under the reasonable assumption that
it is difficult to acquire this knowledge in advance, it would not be in a firm's
interest to make such a commitment because it might prevent it from creating
an efficient security interest.
It might also be argued that, in the case in which all of a borrower's
nonadjusting creditors are voluntary and well informed, the borrower would be
constrained from inefficiently encumbering an asset by the need to protect its
reputation. However, even well-informed creditors are unlikely to know
whether encumbering a particular asset would be efficient or inefficient.
Moreover, since businesses in the borrower's industry will tend to act
similarly, the borrower's use of particular security interests is not likely to be
unconventional or unanticipated. The borrower's reputation will, therefore, be
no better or worse than those of its competitors if it inefficiently encumbers
an asset.
Returning to our example, let us consider the fourth (and most realistic)
case-that in which only some of Firm's nonadjusting creditors are voluntary
and well informed, while the others are either involuntary or rationally
uninformed creditors with small claims. In such a scenario, encumbering the
third asset might still be in Firm's interest if it transfers enough bankruptcy
value from the involuntary or rationally uninformed creditors to make Firm
better off. Thus, when some of Firm's creditors are involuntary or rationally
uninformed, Firm might be better off retaining the ability to encumber the third
asset even when it knows in advance that encumbering that asset would be
inefficient.
Whether or not the nonadjusting creditors in this example are compensated
for the increased risk of loss due to the creation of the three security interests,
what these creditors charge Firm will not be affected by the actual arrangement
between Firm and Bank-because they are involuntary, or are rationally
uninformed about Firm's arrangement with Bank, or had extended credit before
the transaction with Bank. Thus, the use of a security interest providing Bank
with full priority in some of Firm's assets will transfer value from these
creditors. Consequently, Firm and Bank will have an incentive to encumber
assets with a security interest, even if this results in a loss of social value.
V. EFFICIENCY COSTS OF FULL PRIORITY
We are now ready to examine systematically five efficiency costs that arise
when full priority is accorded to secured claims. The first two efficiency costs
are that full priority (1) increases the use of inefficient security interests and
(2) increases the use of security interests that are efficient, but less efficient
than a set of covenants, and therefore undesirable. Full priority thus causes
excessive use of security interests.
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The last three costs-(1) distorted investment and precaution decisions of
the borrower; (2) suboptimal use of the covenants by the secured creditor; and
(3) suboptimal enforcement efforts by the secured creditor-are priority-
dependent efficiency costs of security interests. The effect of these three
priority-dependent efficiency costs is to make the use of any given security
interest less efficient or more inefficient than it would be in a world without
priority. Since these three costs, along with the three priority-independent
efficiency costs of security interests described in Part Im, may be present
whenever a security interest is used under full priority, they would arise even
if full priority did not affect the number of security interests used.
A. The Use of Inefficient Security Interests
As we saw in Part IV, a borrower and a secured creditor may have
incentives under full priority to expend resources inefficiently encumbering an
asset merely to transfer bankruptcy value from nonadjusting creditors. That is,
a borrower and a secured creditor may adopt a security interest that gives the
two parties a larger slice of the pie at the expense of nonadjusting creditors
even though the security interest at the same time reduces the size of the total
pie. This is the first efficiency cost of full priority.
Returning to our hypothetical Firm and Bank, suppose that Firm borrows
$1 million each from three sources: Bank, a nonadjusting creditor, and an
adjusting creditor. Suppose further that there is a 5% chance that Firm will fail
by the end of the year and leave $600,000 of assets to its creditors. Assume
that to obtain a security interest in the $600,000 worth of assets, Bank would
be required to spend $2000, and that use of the security interest would affect
neither the probability of Firm's failure nor the amount of assets that would
be available to Firm's creditors in the event of default. Thus, creating the
security interest would be inherently inefficient because it would reduce the
total value captured by all of the parties by $2000.
Consider the case in which the use of a security interest would not confer
any priority on Bank's claim. In such a case, Bank and Firm would have no
incentive to spend $2000 to create the security interest because Bank would
receive $200,000 (1/3 of $600,000) in bankruptcy whether or not the security
interest had been created. Thus, Bank and Firm would act efficiently under a
rule of no priority by choosing not to adopt the security interest.
Now consider the case in which the security interest would confer full
priority on Bank's claim against Firm. Under a rule of full priority, the
security interest would reduce Bank's risk of loss by $20,000 and would
increase the other creditors' risk of loss by $10,000 each.'37 Since Bank
137. In the absence of a security interest, each creditor would be entitled to $200,000 in bankruptcy
and would thus face an expected loss of $40,000 (.05 x $800,000). If Bank had full priority in the $600,000
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would incur $2000 in contracting costs in connection with the security interest,
and its risk of loss would be reduced by $20,000, it would charge Firm
$18,000 less in interest while the adjusting creditor would charge Firm $10,000
more in interest. Thus, full priority will give Firm an incentive to create an
inefficient security interest merely to transfer value from its nonadjusting
creditors.
B. Distorted Choice Between Security Interests and Covenants
Full priority may also cause commercial borrowers and their sophisticated
creditors to use a security interest that is less efficient than a set of covenants
in order to control inefficient behavior by the borrower after the loan
transaction.
To illustrate, suppose that Bank and Firm will choose either a set of
covenants or a security interest (but not both) to reduce Firm's ability to
engage in inefficient asset dilution after the transaction. Suppose that Firm
already owes $1 million to a nonadjusting creditor, is borrowing $1 million
from Bank, and will borrow $1 million from an adjusting creditor. Suppose
further that, if Bank is given a security interest in $1 million of assets, $1.2
million will be available for distribution to creditors in the event of default,
but, if Bank uses a set of covenants designed to prevent Firm's shareholders
from engaging in inefficient asset dilution, $1.5 million will be available to
creditors in the event Firm fails. Finally, assume that both the set of covenants
and the security interest would impose the same contracting and opportunity
costs on Bank and Firm and that there is a 5% chance that Firm will fail in
either case. Adoption of the set of covenants would clearly be more efficient
because, in the event of bankruptcy, creditors would be $300,000 better off
than if the security interest had been adopted, while shareholders would be no
worse off.
If the security interest were created but did not confer priority on Bank's
claim, each creditor (including Bank and the adjusting creditor) would receive
its pro rata share of $1.2 million-$400,000-in the event of Firm's
bankruptcy. On the other hand, if the set of covenants were adopted, Bank and
the adjusting creditor would receive $500,000 each-one-third of $1.5
million-if Firm fails. As a result, Bank and the adjusting creditor would each
charge Firm $5000 less interest if Firm issued the set of covenants rather than
the security interest.'3" Thus, Firm would have an incentive to issue the set
of bankruptcy assets through use of a security interest, it would face an expected loss of $20,000 (.05 x
$400,000), and the other creditors would each face an expected loss of $50,000 (.05 x $1 million), $10,000
more than in the absence of the security interest.
138. The expected loss for each creditor, the probability of bankruptcy multiplied by the expected loss
in the event, would be $25,000 (.05 x $500,000) if the covenants were adopted and $30,000 (.05 x
$600,000) if the security interest were used.
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of covenants rather than the security interest to Bank under a rule of no
priority.
If the security interest were adopted under the rule of full priority,
however, Bank would receive $1 million, and the adjusting creditor would
receive $100,000 in the event of bankruptcy. 39 Since Bank and the adjusting
creditor would each receive $500,000 if the set of covenants were adopted,
Bank would charge $25,000 less interest, and the adjusting creditor would
charge $20,000 more if Bank were given a security interest. 40 Since Firm
would thus be able to reduce its interest expense by creating the security
interest rather than the set of covenants, it would have an incentive to choose
the less efficient security interest.
C. Distorted Investment and Precaution Decisions
We have just seen that according full priority to secured claims in
bankruptcy causes borrowers and their creditors to use security interests that
are not efficient, or efficient but less efficient than a set of covenants, solely
to transfer value from nonadjusting creditors.
We now turn to a different category of costs that arises from full priority:
costs that may arise whenever a security interest is used under full priority.
These priority-dependent efficiency costs make the use of any given security
interest less efficient or more inefficient than it would be in the absence of
priority. Thus, these costs would arise even if full priority did not affect the
overall use of security interests.
The first priority-dependent efficiency cost of security interests is that their
use under full priority may distort a borrower's choice of investments and level
of precaution. Indeed, as this section will explain, the ability of a borrower to
give a creditor a security interest that subordinates the claims of nonadjusting
creditors may adversely affect the borrower's behavior even before the
borrower and the secured creditor negotiate their loan contract.
Consider the case in which Firm must decide, prior to contracting with
Bank, whether to take certain precautions that will make its products safer and
thereby reduce the number of future tort claims against Firm. Firm knows that
when Bank and Firm later negotiate their loan contract, Bank will take
expected tort claims into account in setting its interest rate. Thus, Bank will
charge Firm a higher interest rate to the extent it anticipates that future tort
139. Recall that the encumbered assets are worth $1 million and total bankruptcy value will be $1.2
million. Thus, Bank would receive $1 million if Firm fails. The adjusting and nonadjusting creditors would
share equally in the $200,000 remaining after Bank's $1 million secured claim is paid. so that the adjusting
creditor would receive $100,000.
140. Bank is avoiding an expected loss of $25,000 because it will not face the 5% chance of losing
$500,000 (the difference between the $1 million it receives under full priority and the $500.000 it would
receive if the covenants were adopted).
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claims will reduce the value of its loan by diluting Bank's share of Firm's
bankruptcy assets. To the extent that Bank adjusts its interest rate to take into
account future tort claims against Firm, Bank forces Firm to internalize more
of the cost of its failure to take precautions. Thus, to the extent that the tort
claims reduce the value of Bank's claim, Firm will have a greater incentive to
take precautions prior to transacting with Bank.
Under the rule of full priority, however, Firm may give Bank a security
interest that more or less protects the value of Bank's loan from being diluted
by tort claims. To the extent that Bank is given a security interest that insulates
its claim from the effect of Firm's activities, it will not charge a higher interest
rate if Firm fails to take precautions and additional tort claims against Firm are
expected. And, to the extent Firm does not face the prospect of a higher
interest rate if it fails to take precautions, Firm will have less incentive to
invest in these precautions."'
To illustrate, suppose that Firm intends to borrow $2 million from Bank,
its only nontort creditor. Suppose further that there is a 5% chance that Firm
will fail by the end of the year, leaving $1 million of assets available to satisfy
its creditors' claims. Assume that if Firm does not take precautions, there is
a 50% chance that it will face $8 million in tort claims by the end of the year,
but that if Firm takes precautions, it will not face any tort claims.
If Bank does not have priority in Firm's bankruptcy assets, its expected
loss is $50,000 if Firm takes precautions, 4 2 and $72,500 if Firm does
not.143 Thus, Bank will charge Firm $22,500 more in interest if Firm does
not take precautions. However, if Bank is given a security interest in the $1
million of assets that will be available to satisfy creditors' claims in
bankruptcy, the expected value of its bankruptcy claim will be $1 million
whether or not Firm takes precautions. Thus, Firm will have less incentive to
take precautions if creditors' claims can be given priority through use of a
security interest.
In essence, the rule of according full priority to secured claims exacerbates
the distortions created by limited liability, a problem that has recently attracted
considerable academic attention.' 44 As that literature has explained, limited
liability allows shareholders to avoid internalizing the full costs imposed on
tort victims by limiting the victims' claims to the amount of the borrower's
141. The fact that the use of security interests under full priority permits the borrower to bear less of
the cost of claims of tort creditors is well recognized. See Buckley, supra note 23, at 1417: LoPucki, supra
note 8, at 1898.
142. There is a 5% chance that Firm will fail, causing Bank to lose $1 million. Bank's expected loss
is thus $50,000 (.05 x $1 million).
143. There is a 2.5% chance that Firm will fail and cause Bank to lose $1 million, and a 2.5% chance
that Firm will fail and cause Bank to lose $1.9 million. Thus, Bank's expected loss is $72,500 ((.025 x $1
million) + (.025 x $1.9 million)).
144. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kmakman. supra note 85. at 1909-16: Leebron. supra note 91. at
1646-49: Painter, supra note 91, at 1054-70.
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assets in bankruptcy. This leads firms to underinvest in precautions and
overinvest in risky activities that externalize harm to other parties. According
full priority to secured claims allows shareholders to avoid internalizing even
more of the costs in the manner we have just described." 5
D. Suboptimal Use of Covenants
The second priority-dependent efficiency cost of security interests is that
their use, under full priority, may cause a secured creditor to use too few
covenants. As we explained in Part IV, in a perfect world in which the terms
of other creditors' loan agreements fully reflect the consequences to them of
the arrangement between a borrower and a creditor, the two parties would have
an incentive to adopt any covenant that is efficient because they would capture
all of the resulting benefits. In the real world, however, nonadjusting creditors
would capture part of the benefits and bear none of the costs of any set of
covenants negotiated between the contracting parties. Consequently, even if the
set of covenants were socially optimal because its total benefits exceeded its
total costs, it would not be privately optimal for the borrower and the creditor
if the benefits accruing to the contracting creditor (and any other adjusting
creditors) were less than the costs to the borrower.146
While this problem-that a borrower and a creditor will have an
insufficient incentive to adopt efficient covenants-generally occurs whenever
there are creditors whose claims do not adjust to reflect fully the agreement
between the parties, the problem becomes more severe if the borrower and the
creditor adopt a security interest under the rule of full priority. In such a case,
the creditor's risk of loss-and therefore the benefit to the creditor of an
additional set of covenants-will be substantially reduced.'4 7 The creditor is
thus even less likely under a rule of full priority to adopt a highly efficient
covenant. 148
145. It is worth noting that full priority may well cause other distortions in a firm's investment
decisions before the firm issues secured debt. For example, to the extent that the firm has an incentive to
offer lenders collateral in order to transfer value from nonadjusting creditors, it may have an incentive to
invest in assets that can easily serve as collateral, even if other investments (such as employee training)
would offer higher social returns.
146. See Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 23, at 242.
147. If the creditor's loan is fully secured, and there is sufficient excess collateral to fully cover the
creditor's collection costs and any unpaid interest, then its risk of loss will approach zero. Cf Hudson,
supra note 27, at 51-52 (observing that bank with secured loan will have no incentive to use its knowledge
of debtor in socially desirable manner because it is fully protected from risk of loss).
148. The point that a creditor that takes security under a rule of full priority is less likely to "monitor"
the debtor through other contractual restrictions is well understood in the literature. See Buckley. supra note
23, at 1440-41; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 23, at 1153; Triantis. Secured Debt, supra note 23. at 244.
For empirical evidence that secured lenders adopt fewer covenants, see Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen,
Contractual Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts. 34 J.L. & ECON. 645,
662 (1991) (reporting that secured bonds contain fewer covenants than unsecured bonds).
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The following numerical example illustrates how full priority exacerbates
the problem of the suboptimal use of covenants. Suppose that there is a 5%
chance that Firm will fail, leaving $1.2 million in assets to be distributed
among Bank, an adjusting creditor owed $1 million, and a nonadjusting
creditor owed $1 million. Firm will give Bank a security interest in collateral
expected to be worth $1 million in the event of bankruptcy. Now Bank and
Firm are considering adopting a set of covenants designed to prevent Firm
from engaging in overinvestment. Adoption of this set of covenants would
reduce the likelihood of Firm failing from 5% to 4%, but reduce the
shareholders' ability to enrich themselves by (an expected value of) $9500.
Since creditors as a group will lose $1.8 million if Firm fails, reducing the
probability of failure by 1% would increase the expected value of creditors'
claims by $18,000. Adoption of the set of covenants would thus increase the
value captured by all of the parties by $8500 ($18,000 less $9500) and
therefore would be efficient.
Let us first consider the case in which the security interest granted Bank
does not confer priority on its claim. In such a case, Bank and the adjusting
creditor would each receive $400,000 of the $1.2 million of assets available
to creditors in the event of default. If the overinvestment covenants were
adopted, thereby reducing the probability of default by 1%, the expected value
of these creditors' claims would each increase by $6000.'49 Firm would
therefore have an incentive to offer Bank the overinvestment covenants since
the resulting reduction in interest charged Firm, i.e. $12,000, would be greater
than the cost to Firm's shareholders of foregoing the opportunity to overinvest,
i.e. $9500.
Now let us consider the case in which the security interest confers priority
on Bank's claim. In such a case Bank would receive $1 million in the event
of failure, and the adjusting creditor would receive $100,000. Reducing the
probability of failure by 1% would increase the expected value of the adjusting
creditor's claim by $9000 but not affect the expected value of Bank's claim.
The overinvestment covenants under the rule of full priority would lead the
adjusting creditor to reduce the interest it charges Firm by $9000, but would
cost Firm's shareholders $9500. Therefore, it would not be in Firm's interest
to offer Bank the overinvestment covenants, even though they would be
efficient.
The general problem illustrated by this example-that a secured creditor
has less incentive to control the borrower's behavior to the extent that a
security interest giving it full priority reduces its risk of loss-also gives rise
to the third priority-dependent efficiency cost of security interests described
below. As we shall see, the use of a security interest under full priority may
149. The expected loss faced by each creditor would decrease by $6000 ((.05 x $600.000) - (.04 x
$600,000)).
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lead to suboptimal control of the borrower even if it does not distort the
secured creditor's use of covenants.
E. Suboptimal Enforcement Efforts
We have seen that, in the presence of nonadjusting creditors, the use of a
security interest under full priority may cause inefficiencies by inducing the
parties to forego the use of desirable covenants once a security interest is
adopted. Now let us consider the case in which the use of a security interest
under full priority has no effect on the parties' adoption of covenants. 50 As
we shall see, even in this case, in which the parties adopt covenants restricting
borrower misbehavior, the use of the security interest under full priority will
permit the borrower to act more inefficiently following the extension of credit.
In analyzing the effect of full priority on the use of covenants in loan
arrangements, we abstracted from the level of a creditor's enforcement
efforts-the activities undertaken by the creditor to ascertain whether the
borrower is continuing to comply with its contractual commitments. However,
as was explained in Part IV, a borrower's incentive to comply with the
covenants it has issued may well depend upon the level of the creditor's
enforcement efforts. That is, the less the creditor monitors the borrower's
compliance with its covenants, the less likely the creditor will detect a breach,
and the more likely the borrower Will find the expected cost of breach to be
less than the expected benefit of breach. To the extent the covenants bar the
borrower from engaging in inefficient activities, the level of the creditor's
enforcement efforts will therefore have efficiency implications.
Even in the absence of full priority, a creditor will engage in less than the
optimal amount of enforcement activity since some of the benefit of this
activity will flow to other creditors, while it (and the borrower) will bear all
of the costs. But the creditor will have even less of an incentive to engage in
enforcement activities to the extent that it is protected from risk of loss by a
security interest giving the creditor's claim full priority in bankruptcy-just as
it will have less of an incentive to adopt even highly efficient covenants. As
a result, a borrower may be more likely to violate a covenant and to act
inefficiently when its sophisticated creditors have security interests giving them
full priority in their collateral. Thus, even if full priority does not cause a
borrower and a creditor to adopt fewer covenants, it may well degrade the
effectiveness of the covenants they do adopt-and lead to efficiency
150. This situation might arise. for example, in the case where a bank uses the same standardized loan
contract whenever it extends credit to a particular class of borrowers, whether or not it also takes a security
interest.
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problems-by reducing the creditor's incentive to monitor the borrower's
compliance with those covenants.'15
The priority-dependent efficiency costs arising from the use of a security
interest are of course especially high when the secured creditor is a
sophisticated lender such as a bank. A bank will typically be quite
knowledgeable about a borrower to which it has extended a significant amount
of credit. And, by virtue of its sophistication, resources, and leverage, the bank
will be able to exert a significant amount of influence over the borrower. 52
Indeed, a bank will frequently determine whether or not a borrower files for
bankruptcy and the timing of any filing.'53 Thus, the bank is in a unique
position to control a borrower's behavior. However, to the extent that the bank
is insulated by a security interest from the effects of the borrower's
misbehavior, the bank will have less incentive to control the borrower's
behavior. 154
Of course, the tendency of full priority to cause secured creditors to adopt
too few covenants and to suboptimally enforce the obligations of their
borrowers would not be a cause of great concern if the borrowers had
unsecured creditors that were capable of similar monitoring. However, the
empirical data on the financing arrangements of privately held small and
medium-sized firms-the issuers of most secured debt'5s-indicate that such
firms almost always have only one institutional creditor (e.g., a bank or finance
company) that is capable of general monitoring.156 (This pattern is also seen
in bankruptcy: The vast majority of all bankruptcy cases involve a debtor with
a principal secured creditor and many small (usually trade) creditors. 57)
Thus, to the extent that one institutional creditor is insulated from risk of loss
by using a security interest giving it full priority, the borrower will be free to
misbehave.
151. The problem that a fully secured creditor will not have a sufficient incentive to monitor the
borrower is recognized even by those who support the rule of full priority. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note
23, at 1440-41. Since all contracts between commercial borrowers and their creditors implicitly incorporate
the various mandatory rules that govem the relationship between debtors and creditors, such as fraudulent-
conveyance law and corporate law limitations on payments to shareholders, the problem of suboptimal
monitoring will arise even if the two parties do not adopt their own privately negotiated covenants.
152. See Hudson, supra note 27, at 51-52; Scott. supra note 6, at 925-33.
153. See Bufford, supra note 89, at 834-35.
154. See Adler, supra note 23, at 83, 88, 92-93; Buckley, supra note 23, at 1469.
155. See Scott, supra note 6, at 940; supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
156. See Petersen & Rajan, supra note 105, at 16 (noting that 82% of sample of firms borrowed from
only one bank); Scott, supra note 6, at 949 (reporting that standard commercial-finance security agreement
provides "that the lender will act as the borrower's 'sole source of financing,"' and that less than 5% of
sample of small businesses developed general financing arrangement with more than one creditor). Larger,
publicly traded firms may borrow from more than one sophisticated creditor, but they generally do not issue
secured debt. See Booth. supra note 5. at 29. 39-41.
157. See Bufford, supra note 89, at 834-35.
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VI. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO FULL PRIORITY
We have seen that a rule of full priority for secured claims leads to certain
inefficiencies in the presence of nonadjusting creditors. In particular, full
priority gives rise to priority-dependent efficiency costs that increase the total
cost associated with the use of security interests, and it causes borrowers and
their sophisticated creditors to increase their use of inefficient security
interests.
In this part we present two rules that would reduce or eliminate these
inefficiencies by providing only partial priority to secured claims. 58 The first
partial-priority rule presented, the "adjustable priority rule," works by denying
secured claims priority over the claims of nonadjusting creditors. This
approach, if properly implemented, would eliminate all of the inefficiencies
associated with full priority that we identified. Under the second partial-priority
rule, the "fixed-fraction priority rule," a fixed fraction of each secured claim
would be treated as an unsecured claim. Both rules would have the effect of
leaving all secured creditors at least partially unsecured. 59
Neither of these partial-priority rules would be superior in every respect
to the rule of full priority. As Part VII will explain, there would be efficiency
costs associated with these rules-or any rule of partial priority-that must be
weighed against the benefits these rules would provide. However, three points
need to be emphasized before we examine the rules in detail. The first is that
neither of these rules would completely eliminate the priority accorded to
secured claims over unsecured claims in bankruptcy. The partial-priority rules
would affect only the degree to which the secured creditor enjoys priority in
its collateral over the claims of unsecured creditors when the debtor enters
bankruptcy. Second, a secured creditor would continue to enjoy full priority
in bankruptcy over the claims of any junior secured creditors in the same
assets. The third and most important point is that neither of these priority rules
would have any effect on the secured creditor's "repossessory right" and state-
law "priority right" outside of bankruptcy. That is, neither alternative would
be inconsistent with Article 9 of the UCC or current state laws governing
transactions in real property. Thus, the operation of security interests outside
bankruptcy would be completely unaffected by either rule.
158. It should be emphasized that these partial-priority rules are not designed to eliminate or reduce
all of the efficiency distortions in loan contracts between commercial borrowers and their lenders-only
those that arise as a result of the rule of full priority. Nor are these rules intended for use in consumer
bankruptcy cases where the individual was not engaged in a business before going bankrupt.
159. Recall that the secured claim is the lesser of (1) the amount owed the lender and (2) the value
of the collateral securing the claim. A secured creditor that takes a security interest in assets worth more
than the amount of the loan would therefore have a secured claim no greater than the amount of its loan.
By turning part of every secured claim into an unsecured claim, the partial-priority rules would ensure that
every secured creditor is partially unsecured.
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A. The Adjustable-Priority Rule
As we have seen, a serious problem with the rule of full priority is that it
allows a borrower to transfer value from creditors that do not adjust their
claims to reflect the terms of the borrower's relationship with a secured
creditor. This transfer of value in turn leads to the various inefficiencies
described in Part V. The adjustable-priority rule, which would deny a secured
claim priority over the claims of creditors that were nonadjusting with respect
to the security interest underlying the secured claim, would be a natural
alternative to full priority because it goes directly to the root of the problem
that arises under that rule.
One might question whether a bankruptcy court could in fact identify those
creditors of a debtor that were nonadjusting with respect to a particular security
interest in order to enforce such a rule. We will address the feasibility of
implementing the adjustable-priority rule shortly. For the moment, however,
let us assume that the court would be able to identify a debtor's nonadjusting
creditors to examine how the rule would work under ideal conditions.
Suppose that our hypothetical Firm goes bankrupt with $1.2 million in
assets and outstanding liabilities of $3 million, $1 million of which is owed to
Bank, $1 million of which is owed to an adjusting unsecured creditor, and $1
million of which is owed to a nonadjusting creditor. Assume further that $1
million of the assets are subject to a security interest held by Bank.
In the absence of any priority, the $1.2 million in assets would be divided
on a pro rata basis with each creditor receiving $400,000.'60 Under the rule
of full priority, and assuming that all unsecured creditors share pro rata in the
remaining assets, Bank would receive $1 million and the remaining $200,000
in assets would be divided equally between the other two creditors. The result
under full priority would be that $300,000 of bankruptcy value is transferred
from each unsecured creditor to Bank, the secured creditor. Bank thus benefits
under the full-priority rule at the equal expense of both the adjusting and the
nonadjusting creditor.
Under the adjustable-priority rule, claims of nonadjusting creditors would
not be subordinated to secured claims with respect to which they were
nonadjusting. The adjustable-priority rule would require that, when applying
the rule of full priority, a nonadjusting creditor's share of bankruptcy value be
calculated by treating as unsecured the secured claims with respect to which
the creditor was nonadjusting. The extra amount received by the nonadjusting
creditor under the adjustable-priority rule (relative to what it would have
received under full priority) would come solely at the expense of the secured
160. Under U.S. bankruptcy law. certain "priority" unsecured creditors-such as the government and
employees of the debtor-are entitled to have some or all of their claims paid ahead of those of general
unsecured creditors. See supra note 16. However, for ease of exposition, we continue to assume in our
examples that all unsecured creditors are treated equally in bankruptcy.
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claims with respect to which it was nonadjusting. Adjusting creditors would
receive what they would have received under the rule of full priority. 6 '
In this example, Bank's claim would be treated as unsecured when
applying the rule of full priority to determine the nonadjusting creditor's
bankruptcy share. As a result, in this example, the nonadjusting creditor would
be entitled to receive $400,000. The $300,000 difference between what the
nonadjusting creditor would have received under the rule of full
priority-$100,000-and what it would receive under the adjustable-priority
rule-$400,000-would come at the expense of Bank's secured claim. The
adjusting creditor would receive what it would have received under full
priority-$ 100,000 and the Bank would receive the balance-700,000.
Since the adjustable-priority rule would ensure that the use of a security
interest would not affect the nonadjusting creditor's share of bankruptcy value,
it would prevent the security interest from being used to transfer bankruptcy
value from nonadjusting creditors. Thus, such a rule, if it could be
implemented fully, would eliminate the inefficiencies we identified as arising
out of full priority: the use of inefficient security interests, the distorted choice
between covenants and security interests, the increased distortions in the
borrower's investments and level of precaution, and the suboptimal use and
enforcement of covenants.
To illustrate the ex ante incentives created by the adjustable-priority rule,
let us return to the example used in Section V.B to illustrate the problem of
distorted choice between security interests and covenants. Recall that Bank and
Firm will choose either a set of covenants or a security interest (but not both)
to reduce Firm's ability to engage in inefficient asset dilution after Bank
extends $1 million of credit to Firm. Firm also borrows $1 million from an
adjusting creditor and $1 million from a nonadjusting creditor. If Bank is given
a security interest under full priority, $1.2 million of assets will be available
to be distributed to creditors in the event of default ($1 million of which will
satisfy Bank's secured claim). However, if Bank uses a set of covenants
designed to prevent Fiim's shareholders from engaging in inefficient asset
dilution, $1.5 million will be available to creditors in the event Firm fails.
Recall that both the set of covenants and the security interest would impose the
same contracting and opportunity costs on Bank and Firm, and that there is a
5% chance that Firm will fail in any event. Thus, as explained, adoption of the
set of covenants would be more efficient because, in the event of bankruptcy,
creditors would be $300,000 better off than if the security interest were used,
while shareholders would be no worse off (before interest is paid).
161. In principle, the adjustable-priority rule could be modified to reallocate the value between secured
and adjusting creditors since bankruptcy transfers between secured and adjusting creditors would not give
rise to any of the inefficiencies identified in Part V.
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However, we saw that, under the full-priority rule, Bank would receive $1
million and the adjusting creditor would receive $100,000 in the event of
bankruptcy if the security interest were adopted, while those same two
creditors would receive a total of only $1 million if the covenants were
adopted. Thus, Bank and the adjusting creditor would charge Firm less in
interest if the security interest were adopted. As a result, under the rule of full
priority, Firm and Bank would have an incentive to create the security interest
rather than the set of covenants.
Now let us consider Firm's incentives under the adjustable-priority rule.
If Firm issues the security interest rather than the covenants under the
adjustable-priority rule, the nonadjusting creditor would receive $400,000 in
the event of bankruptcy-the amount it would have received under the full-
priority rule had Bank's claim been unsecured. 62 Since the nonadjusting
creditor would have received only $100,000 under full priority, the adjustable-
priority rule would increase its share by $300,000. This comes at the expense
of Bank, which would therefore receive only $700,000. The adjusting creditor
would still receive $100,000. Thus, Bank and the adjusting creditor would
receive a total of $800,000 if the security interest were adopted, and therefore
charge Firm more interest than if Firm had given the set of covenants. Firm
and Bank would therefore have an incentive to choose the set of covenants
over the less efficient security interest under the adjustable-priority rule.
While a partial-priority rule giving secured claims priority only over
adjusting claims has never, to our knowledge, been proposed, a growing
number of commentators have proposed that tort claims be given superpriority
over secured claims in bankruptcy. 63 The goal of these proposals has been
to increase the incentive for commercial borrowers to reduce harmful
externalities. As we explained in Section V.C, the ability of a borrower to
subordinate tort creditors' claims by issuing security interests under a rule of
full priority allows it to internalize less of the cost it imposes on these parties
than it would under a pro rata rule. Superpriority would force borrowers to
internalize even more of these tort costs than would a pro rata rule, and
presumably would lead borrowers to take even more precautions and choose
even better projects.
However, even if superpriority for tort claims were the best method for
addressing the problem of tort externalities, which may or may not be the
162. Both the nonadjusting and the adjusting creditors' $1 million claims are unsecured. Treating
Bank's $I million claim as unsecured thus entitles the nonadjusting creditor to one-third of the $1.2 million
in assets, or $400,000.
163. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy,
45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 340 (1993); Leebron, supra note 91, at 1650; LoPucki, supra note 8. at 1907-08;
Painter, supra note 91, at 1080-81; Roe, supra note 27, at 227.
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case,"6 the scheme would at best somewhat reduce, and certainly not
eliminate, the efficiency problems that are caused by full priority. As
explained, the efficiency costs of according full priority to secured claims arise
because of the existence of nonadjusting creditors, primarily voluntary creditors
and government tax and regulatory agencies. Giving superpriority to tort claims
would immunize tort creditors from the effects of priority, thereby reducing the
efficiency costs we identified to the extent that they are caused by the presence
of tort creditors. However, unlike the adjustable-priority rule, such a scheme
would not reduce the distortions and efficiency costs to the extent that they are
caused by the presence of contractual nonadjusting creditors and government
tax and regulatory claims.165
To be sure, whether or not the adjustable-priority rule is worth adopting
would depend in part on whether it could be administered in practice.
Complete elimination of the inefficiencies that we show arise from full priority
would require identifying during the bankruptcy proceeding those creditors that
were adjusting and those creditors that were nonadjusting with respect to the
various security interests issued by the debtor. Since it would clearly not be
feasible to determine whether each creditor had in fact "adjusted" to each
particular security interest, the adjustable-priority rule could never completely
eliminate the identified inefficiencies.
Nevertheless, it would be possible to implement a version of the
adjustable-priority rule that would significantly reduce the inefficiencies we
identify. Many creditors that are nonadjusting with respect to a particular
security interest are easily identifiable: (1) those creditors that had extended
credit before the creation of the security interest and lacked an adjustment
mechanism in their loan contracts with the debtor; (2) tort creditors; (3)
government tax and regulatory agencies; and (4) such creditors as employees,
customers, and utilities that are not in the business of lending, were not able
to take the existence of particular security interests into account when
contracting with the debtor, and in fact did not negotiate any credit terms with
the debtor. In addition, nonadjusting treatment could be automatically accorded
to all creditors with claims below a fixed, low threshold-say, $10,000 or
$25,000. Creditors with such small claims will be rationally nonadjusting even
if they are commercially sophisticated because it would generally not be
164. See Susan Block-Lieb, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain: A Reply, 80 VA. L. REV. 1989.
1994-97 (1994) (questioning superpriority for tort claims on grounds that making secured creditors liable
for these claims may not be most efficient method for reducing harmful externalities by firm).
165. One commentator who has advocated superpriority for tort claims has extended that proposal to
deny a secured claim priority over the claims of any voluntary creditors that did not expect to be
subordinated by that claim. See LoPucki, supra note 8. at 1913, 1947-48. Since there are many
nonadjusting creditors that expect to have their claims subordinated in bankruptcy-such as the government,
trade creditors, and prior creditors with large claims-such a proposal (assuming that it could be
implemented) would fail to eliminate the problem of creditor nonadjustment and the resulting efficiency
problems we analyze.
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worthwhile to conduct a detailed investigation of the financial structure of a
borrower before extending such a small amount of credit. 166 A "limited"
adjustable-priority rule such as this would substantially reduce the
inefficiencies identified in Part V at little administrative Cost.
67
However, even if a limited adjustable-priority rule could substantially
reduce the efficiency costs associated with full priority, one may nevertheless
believe that such a rule would be undesirable because of the uncertainty it
would create for secured creditors. It is therefore worth considering a partial-
priority rule in which secured creditors know with reasonable certainty what
they will receive in bankruptcy, such as the fixed-fraction rule presented
below.
B. The Fixed-Fraction Priority Rule
We now turn to examine the second partial-priority rule we present as an
alternative to full priority: the fixed-fraction priority rule. Under this rule, a
fixed fraction of a secured creditor's secured claim would continue to be
treated as a secured claim, and the remainder would be treated as an unsecured
claim. Thus, under a 75% fixed-fraction rule, 75% of a secured claim would
be given full priority over unsecured claims, and the remaining 25% would
become an unsecured claim.
A variant of the fixed-fraction priority rule was in fact proposed by the
German Commission on Bankruptcy Law in 1985 as a replacement for the rule
of full priority in German bankruptcy law.16 That proposal recommended
that secured creditors be given only 75% of the amount of their secured claims
collateralized by personal property. One of the justifications for the proposed
rule was that, as our analysis demonstrates, exposing secured creditors to
increased risk of loss is likely to encourage more desirable monitoring of their
borrowers. 69 Although the new German Insolvency Law (Insolvenzordnung)
passed in 1994 did not include this 75% rule, it did incorporate several new
166. See supra Subsection IV.C.3.
167. One might worry that using a bright-line rule to distinguish between adjusting and nonadjusting
creditors would distort loan transactions by causing lenders to limit inefficiently the size of their loans for
the purpose of obtaining nonadjusting treatment in bankruptcy. There are three reasons why such distortions
are not likely to occur. First, since the likelihood that a borrower will fail is usually rather small, a creditor
will generally lose much more by limiting the size of its loans to $10,000 or $25,000 (either in foregone
interest as a lender, or in foregone profit as a financing seller) than it will gain, on an expected-value basis,
from achieving nonadjusting treatment in bankruptcy. Second, relying on small loan transactions would
increase transaction costs for both borrowers and lenders. Third, borrowing from creditors that are treated
as nonadjusting in bankruptcy would simply cause secured creditors to charge higher interest rates to the
borrower (since their position in bankruptcy will be worsened to the extent that there are nonadjusting
claims). Consequently, neither borrowers nor creditors would appear to have much incentive to distort their
loan transactions in order to obtain favorable treatment under a bright-line rule.
168. See Drukarczyk, supra note 1. at 205.
169. Id. The other justification for the proposed rule was that it was unfair to fully subordinate the
claims of unsecured creditors since personal property liens in Germany are difficult to discover. Id.
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features that will have the effect of reducing the priority of secured claims in
German bankruptcy proceedings.
70
To illustrate the operation of the fixed-fraction partial-priority rule, we will
consider the version in which the secured creditor receives full priority with
respect to 75% of its secured claim. Assume again that when Firm goes
bankrupt it has $1.2 in assets and owes $1 million each to Bank, an adjusting
creditor, and a nonadjusting creditor. As in the example used to illustrate the
operation of the adjustable-priority rule, Bank has a security interest with
respect to $1 million of Firm's assets.
Under the 75% fixed-fraction priority rule, Bank would receive $750,000
of the encumbered assets. The remainder of its claim, $250,000, would be
made unsecured and pooled with those of the other two creditors. The
$450,000 in assets available to pay unsecured claims would then be distributed
to the three creditors in proportion to their unsecured claims, so that unsecured
claims would be paid 20¢ on the dollar. Bank would receive $50,000 for its
unsecured claim, and the others would receive $200,000 each. In this example,
the nonadjusting creditor would receive $200,000 under the 75% fixed-fraction
priority rule, 50% less than the $400,000 it would receive under the adjustable-
priority rule, but twice as much as the $100,000 it would receive under full
priority.
Like the adjustable-priority rule, the fixed-fraction priority rule would
reduce the ability of creditors and their commercial borrowers to use security
interests to transfer value from nonadjusting creditors by preventing secured
claims from fully subordinating nonadjusting claims in bankruptcy. The fixed-
fraction priority rule would therefore also decrease the inefficiencies identified
in Part V. The reduction of these distortions would depend on the percentage
of the secured claim that is treated as unsecured: The larger the percentage, the
greater would be the reduction in the identified inefficiencies. Eliminating the
inefficiencies altogether would thus require treating the entire secured claim as
unsecured.
Although a rule such as the 75% fixed-fraction rule would reduce but not
eliminate the inefficiencies identified in this Article, it might be preferable to
170. Under the previous German bankruptcy law, many categories of secured creditors were effectively
bankruptcy-proof by virtue of their ability to recover their collateral at any time during the bankruptcy
proceeding. By contrast, the new Insolvency Law permits a bankruptcy administrator to apply for
permission to use a secured creditor's collateral for the benefit of the estate (and its other creditors). See
EUROPEAN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY, supra note 42, at 185-86: Anton Burger & Bernhard Schellberg, The
"Insolvency Plan" in the New German Insolvency Law, I 1 TOLLEY'S INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 8, 11
(1995). Under the law, secured creditors may also be required to pay to the estate up to 6% of the proceeds
they receive from the sale of the collateral. See EUROPEAN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY, supra note 42, at 186.
It is also worth noting that, in 1982, the United Kingdom's Cork Commission proposed an even more
limited version of the fixed-fraction priority rule under which 10% of the property subject to floating
charges (such as inventory) would be made available to pay unsecured claims. See Goode. supra note 1.
at 66-67. The Cork Commission's proposal, which was never adopted. apparently was motivated
exclusively by fairness and distributional concerns. See id.
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the adjustable-priority rule because it would create less uncertainty for secured
creditors and would be somewhat easier to administer. And, as we explain in
the next section, a fixed-fraction priority rule would certainly be preferable to
the currently prevailing de facto rule of partial priority.
C. The Existing Erosion of Priority
While in principle U.S. bankruptcy law accords full priority to secured
claims in bankruptcy, in practice, secured claims currently often receive less
than full priority. It therefore might be argued that if partial priority were
preferable to full priority, there would be no need to modify the existing
regime. However, even assuming that the degree of partial priority faced by
secured creditors in the existing bankruptcy regime were appropriate, the
system currently achieves partial priority in a manner that is clearly
undesirable.
Erosion of full priority under the existing regime works primarily through
Chapter 11, where the focus is not on preserving state-law entitlements, but on
encouraging the parties to agree to a reorganization plan that will enable the
debtor to continue operating.'' If an insolvent firm does not liquidate
immediately under Chapter 7, but rather first seeks to reorganize its capital
structure under Chapter 11, a number of aspects of Chapter 11 will tend to
reduce the value of a creditor's secured claim. A full description of how
Chapter 11 undermines the priority of secured claims is beyond the scope of
this Article, but the following discussion highlights the key features of Chapter
11 that lead to this result.
Under black-letter bankruptcy law, a secured creditor is entitled to receive
interest on its secured claim 172 and any income generated by the
collateral 173 during the proceeding only to the extent that the value of its
collateral exceeds the amount of the claim. Thus, the secured creditor is not
always compensated for the time-value of its money during the Chapter 11
proceeding, which typically takes a year and a half or more. 74
In principle, the court must provide "adequate protection' '175 of a secured
creditor's interest in the collateral throughout the proceedings. If the debtor's
assets fall in value and the debtor is eventually liquidated, however, the
secured creditor may receive less than the value of its collateral as measured
at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed. In fact, since keeping bankrupt
171. See Rogers, supra note 8. at 975; White, Recent Erosion, supra note 23, at 399.
172. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
173. See United States Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest. 484 U.S. 365. 372-73 (1988):
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD. THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 204-05 (1993).
174. See Baird, supra note 17. at 916 (citing Lynn M. LoPucki. The Trouble with Chapter I1. 1993
Wis. L. REv. 729, 739-45).
175. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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businesses in operation is costly, it is common for the debtor's assets to be
worth substantially less at the end of a failed reorganization proceeding.
7 6
Finally, if the debtor emerges from Chapter 11, the secured creditor will
generally not be allowed to take physical possession of the collateral.
Bankruptcy law requires only that the secured creditor be paid off with a note
promising cash payments with a present value of at least the value of the
secured creditor's interest in the collateral. 177 However, bankruptcy judges
will often choose an artificially low discount rate for the payments or
undervalue the collateral (in order to reduce the debt and interest burden on the
debtor emerging from bankruptcy), thus forcing the secured creditor to accept
less than the full value of its secured claim. 78 Commentators generally
believe that the cumulative effect of these rules and practices is to divert value
from secured creditors to both unsecured creditors and equityholders.
79
Even assuming that the erosion of priority is optimal under the current
regime, there are three significant problems associated with the way in which
the erosion is achieved. First, whether and to what extent the secured creditor's
priority claim is undermined under the current regime depend on such
extraneous factors as whether the debtor decides to immediately liquidate under
Chapter 7 or spend time in Chapter 11, the amount of excess value in the
collateral, and the particular preferences of the bankruptcy court overseeing the
case. The priority of secured claims is thus undermined in an arbitrary and
unpredictable way, creating unnecessary uncertainty ex ante for all creditors.
Second, the degree of erosion is not fixed by statute, but rather determined
by the course of the bankruptcy proceedings. The participants in the
reorganization thus have an incentive to use the proceedings strategically to
maximize their respective shares of the bankruptcy pie. The struggle over the
division of bankruptcy value frequently interferes with the ongoing operations
of the debtor firm, leading to efficiency losses.' Thus, partial priority is
currently achieved at the expense of efficiency in bankruptcy.
Finally, under the current regime, some of the value diverted from secured
creditors may well end up in the hands of shareholders. Transferring the value
from secured creditors to shareholders in bankruptcy does not reduce the
ability of these parties to divert value from nonadjusting creditors. Thus, such
a transfer of value does not generate any of the efficiency benefits that we
show would result from transferring bankruptcy value to nonadjusting
creditors. Indeed, it is believed that the redistribution of value from creditors
as a group to shareholders in bankruptcy actually exacerbates the tendency of
shareholders to engage in inefficient and risky behavior before bankruptcy by
176. See Baird, supra note 17. at 916.
177. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1994).
178. See Baird, supra note 17. at 915.
179. See, e.g., Weiss. supra note 41, at 77-78.
180. See Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 25. at 264; Franks & Torous, supra note 25. at 747-48.
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reducing the cost to them of failure.'18 Both the arbitrariness and the
incentives to engage in inefficient behavior that are associated with the existing
erosion of priority thus make the current bankruptcy regime a poor vehicle for
implementing partial priority.
VII. THE COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF A PARTIAL-PRIORITY RULE
We have seen that the rule of full priority is associated with a number of
efficiency costs and that a partial-priority rule would be able to reduce or
eliminate those costs. However, a rule of partial priority would give rise to its
own set of costs that must be analyzed before a final determination can be
made that partial priority should be adopted. In this part, we accordingly begin
such an analysis. Section VII.A offers a preliminary examination of the
efficiency costs associated with partial priority. The results of this examination
suggest that the efficiency costs of a partial-priority rule may not be
substantial. Section VII.B then shows that the actual practices of sophisticated
creditors and their borrowers support our view that partial priority is likely to
be desirable. In Section VII.C, we demonstrate that a partial-priority rule could
be sufficiently enforced to be made effective.
A. The Efficiency Costs of Partial Priority
In Part III, we identified the priority-independent costs and benefits of
security interests. In Part V, we examined three priority-dependent costs of
security interests and showed that inefficient security interests will be used
when full priority is accorded to secured claims in bankruptcy. We now turn
to examine the benefits that arise only to the extent secured claims are
accorded priority in bankruptcy over unsecured claims. A rule of partial
priority will give rise to efficiency costs by reducing these benefits, and the
magnitude of these costs must be ascertained before a final determination can
be made that partial priority is superior to full priority.
To our knowledge, the secured-debt literature describes only three priority-
dependent efficiency benefits of security interests. These are the ability of
security interests, when secured claims are accorded priority, to:
(1) reduce the information-acquisition costs of secured creditors;
(2) reduce monitoring-coordination costs when a borrower has a number
of sophisticated creditors; and
(3) facilitate the financing of desirable activities.
181. See LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK, THE EFFECTS OF CHAPTER 11 AND DEBT RENEGOTIATION ON Ex ANTE
CORPORATE DECISIONS 2-3 (Harvard Law School Program in Law and Economics Discussion Paper No.
104, 1991).
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The preliminary analysis we offer below indicates that these benefits-and the
cost of reducing them-are likely to be rather modest.
1. Increased Information-Acquisition Costs
Under the rule of full priority, a security interest allows a secured creditor
to extend credit at an appropriate interest rate that fully compensates it for the
costs it incurs in lending to the borrower, without expending significant
resources to acquire information about the borrower's probability of default
and the expected value of the creditor's share of the borrower's bankruptcy
assets.1 82 If the value of the assets subject to the secured creditor's security
interest is greater than the amount due under the loan, including accrued
interest and collection costs, the rule of full priority ensures that, in principle,
the secured creditor faces no risk of loss in lending to the borrower. Thus, the
creditor need not calculate its expected loss in order to extend credit to the
borrower at the proper interest rate.
Under either of the two partial-priority rules considered, a secured creditor
would be exposed to risk of loss, even if its claim were fully secured. Thus,
the secured creditor-if its claim were large enough-would have an incentive
to incur costs acquiring information about the borrower before it extended
credit to ensure that its interest rate would fully compensate it for the risk of
loss from lending to that particular borrower. Thus, the transaction costs
associated with the extension of secured credit would be higher under partial
priority than under a rule of full priority.
The extent of the information-acquisition costs under partial priority would
of course depend on the particular partial-priority rule adopted. Under the 75%
fixed-fraction priority rule, a secured creditor could anticipate receiving at least
75% of the value of its secured claim by the end of the bankruptcy proceeding.
The secured creditor thus could set a reasonably appropriate interest rate
simply by estimating the probability of the borrower's default. In contrast, use
of the adjustable-priority rule might require a secured creditor to estimate the
probability of the borrower's default, the amount of both nonadjusting and
adjusting claims against the borrower, and the amount of the borrower's
bankruptcy assets in order to set a proper interest rate. The increase in
information-acquisition costs borne by secured creditors would therefore be
smaller under the 75% fixed-fraction rule than under the adjustable-priority
rule.
However, providing secured creditors an incentive to acquire more
information about the riskiness of their borrowers' activities may well be
socially desirable. As we explained in Part V, the ability to use secured debt
under a rule of full priority to externalize further the cost of firms' activities
182. See B uckley, supra note 23, at 1421-22.
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increases the incentive of shareholders to engage in risky activities and take
insufficient precautions. To the extent that a partial-priority rule would cause
the interest rates charged by secured creditors to reflect firm risk more
accurately, the partial-priority rule would force shareholders to internalize more
of the cost of their firms' activities. The adjustment of secured creditors'
interest rates would thus cause these borrowers to act more efficiently. 183 If
the increase in information-acquisition costs is less than the gain in efficiency
that results from forcing borrowers to internalize more of the cost of their
activities, then, on balance, it would be desirable for secured creditors to incur
the higher information-acquisition expenses to accomplish that result.' 4
2. Increased Cost of Coordinating Monitoring Efforts Among Creditors
We now consider the second priority-dependent efficiency benefit of
security interests: the ability of a security interest under the rule of full priority
to permit multiple creditors to coordinate their contractual control
("monitoring") of a borrower. Commentators have offered three explanations
as to how a security interest giving a creditor full priority in certain assets of
the borrower may be able to facilitate a more efficient level of monitoring by
creditors. All of these explanations begin with the premise that there may be
inefficient overmonitoring or undermonitoring if a borrower leaves all of its
sophisticated creditors unsecured.
The first explanation is that a borrower may be able to reduce
overmonitoring under the rule of full priority by giving a security interest to
the creditors least capable of monitoring it, while leaving the creditors most
capable of monitoring the borrower unsecured. According to this
explanation-the "relative-skill theory"-providing security to the least capable
monitors should reduce or eliminate their risk of loss and thus their need to
engage in monitoring, while shifting the risk (and therefore the incentive to
monitor) to the most capable (i.e., most cost-effective) creditors; the borrower
is able to reduce its overall interest expense by relieving the least cost-effective
creditors of the need to monitor.8 5
An alternative explanation-the "specialization theory"--is that a borrower
may be able to reduce the overmonitoring that would result from leaving all
183. To the extent that the interest rate on a secured loan reflects the riskiness of the borrower's
activities, the borrower will have more of an incentive to take precautions and choose less risky projects
before the secured credit is extended and to agree to restrictions on its activities during the term of the loan.
184. It should also be noted that the owners of a firm seeking secured credit might be able to reduce
substantially the information-acquisition costs bome by a secured creditor under partial priority by offering
guarantees to the creditor secured by their own real or personal property. In fact, it is currently common
for owners of small firms to offer their own property as collateral when these firms borrow from a
sophisticated creditor. Such an arrangement is desirable because it reduces the information-acquisition costs
of the sophisticated creditors while directly increasing the incentive of the owners to run their firms more
efficiently.
185. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 23, at 1154-56; Levmore, supra note 23, at 58-59.
1996]
The Yale Law Journal
creditors unsecured by using security interests to assign creditors the tasks of
monitoring different assets. Securing these creditors with specific collateral
might allow the borrower to reduce the cost of monitoring by permitting each
creditor to focus on and develop an expertise in monitoring certain assets
rather than the overall financial health of the borrower. 18
6
Finally, it has been suggested that a borrower may be able to reduce the
overmonitoring or undermonitoring that would result from having all of its
creditors unsecured by giving one creditor a security interest in the borrower's
most important assets-its "focal point" assets-the control of which would
benefit all creditors by preventing the borrower from engaging in inefficient
activities. According to this explanation-the "focal point" theory-the secured
creditor monitors on behalf of all of the other creditors, and is compensated for
its efforts with a priority interest in the borrower's assets. The other creditors
rely on the secured creditor to police the borrower, reducing their interest rates
because they need not expend resources monitoring the borrower.1
87
These monitoring-coordination theories have been criticized on various
grounds. For example, commentators have pointed out that, while the "relative
skill" theory would predict that borrowers would secure the creditors that were
the least capable monitors, the sophisticated creditors are in fact the most
likely creditors to be secured. 88 The "focal point" theory, which suggests
that unsecured creditors will lower their interest rates when a skilled monitor
is given a security interest in the borrower's most important assets, has been
challenged on the ground that unsecured creditors capable of monitoring will
not rely on the monitoring of a secured creditor because at any time the
borrower and the secured creditor may agree to transactions involving the
collateral that make them better off at the expense of other creditors. 89
However, even if security interests do provide a priority-dependent
efficiency benefit by coordinating monitoring efforts by multiple creditors in
certain situations, the magnitude of this benefit under full priority would not
be significant. The presence of more than one monitoring creditor does, as
these theories suggest, give rise to efficiency costs that the borrower would
have an incentive to eliminate. Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that firms
that borrow from more than one institutional lender pay higher rates of
interest. 90 However, borrowers apparently avoid these coordination costs by
not borrowing from more than one such lender in the first instance. As we
186. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 3, at 324-28; Baird, supra note 102, at 57. Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 23, at 1154 n.45. Another version of this theory is that full priority allows secured
creditors to specialize in monitoring a firm's assets while unsecured creditors monitor the general financial
condition of the borrower. For a critical discussion of this theory, see Buckley, supra note 23, at 1442-45.
187. See Levmore, supra note 23. at 54-57.
188. See Buckley, supra note 23, at 1441-42; Levmore, supra note 23, at 53; Schwartz, Security
Interests, supra note 23, at 11 n.28.
189. See Buckley, supra note 23, at 1442-43.
190. See Petersen & Rajan. supra note 105. at 34.
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explained, the empirical data on the financing arrangements of small and
medium-sized firms-the issuers of most commercial secured debt in the
United States-show that these firms almost always have only one
sophisticated creditor (e.g., a bank or finance company) that is capable of
engaging in general monitoring of the firm.' 9' In other words, there is little
need for whatever monitoring-coordination benefits are provided by security
interests under full priority. Thus, even assuming that security interests could,
in theory, provide a priority-dependent efficiency benefit by coordinating the
monitoring activity of creditors, on an aggregate basis this benefit is not likely
to be substantial.
Moreover, to the extent that security interests provide a priority-dependent
efficiency benefit by coordinating the monitoring efforts of sophisticated
creditors, the adoption of a partial-priority rule need not significantly reduce
this benefit. An analysis of the effect of different partial-priority rules on the
monitoring efficiencies that arise under these scenarios is beyond the scope of
this Article. However, it is worth noting that if a debtor has two monitoring
creditors-one secured, one unsecured-the use of a 75% fixed-fraction
priority rule is unlikely to reduce dramatically the incentive of the secured
creditor to police the collateral subject to its security interest,' g9 or to reduce
the incentive of the sophisticated unsecured creditor to engage in general
monitoring of the debtor. Consequently, a partial-priority rule might largely
preserve whatever monitoring-coordination efficiency benefits are conferred by
security interests.
3. Reduced Financing for Desirable Activities
Until now we have assumed that, whether or not secured claims are
accorded full priority over unsecured claims in bankruptcy, the loan
transactions we have studied would take place. However, a secured creditor is
likely to charge a higher interest rate under a partial-priority rule than under
the rule of full priority to compensate for the lower value of its bankruptcy
claim. In such a case, the loan transaction may not go forward. Without the
financing, the borrower may not be able to begin operating, continue its
activities, or pursue a particular project that the secured loan is needed to
finance. Thus, a number of commentators believe that an important benefit of
full priority is that it permits the financing of desirable activities that otherwise
could not be financed. 193
191. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
192. Cf Baird, supra note 17, at 919 (observing that reducing priority of secured creditor may not lead
to efficiency loss from decreased monitoring).
193. See, e.g., Harris & Mooney, supra note 8, at 2033, 2037; Stulz & Johnson, supra note 23, at 502,
515-20.
19961
The Yale Law Journal
Those who believe that full priority is desirable because it reduces the
interest expense borne by firms may be concerned that a rule of partial priority
would prevent the financing of some efficient activities that a rule of full
priority would facilitate. On closer inspection, however, this problem is likely
to be much less serious than it may appear. In fact, as we explain, a partial-
priority rule is more likely to prevent the financing of an inefficient activity
than an efficient one.
To analyze the effect of different priority rules on the projects chosen by
firms, let us first examine the simple case in which all of the creditors are
perfectly adjusting. For example, assume that Bank and an adjusting unsecured
creditor each lend Firm $1 million, and that Bank is given a security interest.
Suppose that under a rule of full priority Bank charges Firm $80,000 in
interest and the adjusting creditor charges Firm $120,000 in interest, so that
Firm owes a total of $200,000 in interest. Under a rule of partial priority such
as the 75% fixed-fraction rule, Bank would increase the interest it charges
Firm because-everything else being equal-the expected value of its
bankruptcy claim would be lower. Suppose, for example, that to compensate
for the increased risk of loss under partial priority, Bank increases the interest
rate it charges Firm to $90,000. Thus, under partial priority, Firm would be
required to pay Bank $10,000 more in interest. However, the increase in
Bank's risk of loss would be offset by an equal decrease in the adjusting
creditor's risk of loss which will reduce the interest it charges Firm by
$10,000. As a result, the total interest payments faced by Firm would be the
same under full and partial priority if all of the creditors other than Bank were
perfectly adjusting.
In the real world, of course, many creditors-such as the government and
tort creditors-will not charge a lower interest rate under partial priority than
under full priority. Thus, the next step is to examine the effect of changing
priority regimes under the assumption that many of a borrower's creditors will
not adjust their interest rates to take into account the priority rule that is in
place. For concreteness, let us assume that Firm borrows $1 million from Bank
and owes the government another $1 million. As in the previous case, Bank
will charge Firm $80,000 in interest under full priority and $90,000 in interest
under partial priority. However, since the government is nonadjusting, the size
of its claim will be the same under either rule. As a result, the total interest
payments faced by Firm will be $10,000 higher under a rule of partial priority.
This example suggests that the commentators who have defended full priority
are correct in concluding that full priority reduces the interest borrowers must
pay.
Let us now consider the effect of the priority rule on the willingness of
Firm's owners to undertake certain projects. Continuing with the example,
suppose that the activity that Bank's $1 million loan is required to finance
would yield a benefit to Firm's shareholders equal to $85,000. Recall that
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under the rule of full priority Bank would charge Firm only $80,000 in
interest. Thus, the shareholders would undertake the activity because they
would be $5000 better off. Under partial priority, however, the shareholders
would forego the activity because Bank would charge them $90,000 in interest.
This example suggests that partial priority would in fact foreclose some
activities permitted under full priority.
But let us examine the nature of the activities that are foreclosed under
partial priority. One can see that it is the activities generating between $80,001
and $90,000 worth of benefits for Firm's shareholders that would take place
under full priority but not under partial priority. Under full priority, these
activities would generate a net benefit to shareholders of between $1 and
$10,000 while compensating Bank for its risk of loss. However, since full
priority increases the expected value of Bank's bankruptcy claim by $10,000
(allowing it to reduce the interest charged Firm by $10,000), full priority must
reduce the expected value of the government's claims by $10,000. Thus,
moving to full priority would be inefficient because it would make
nonadjusting creditors worse off by $10,000 and shareholders better off by a
lesser amount. In other words, the activities that are likely to be precluded
under partial priority but would be facilitated under full priority are those that
are inefficient. 94
Indeed, it has been widely observed that, by transferring value from
nonadjusting creditors, a security interest under full priority may permit the
financing of inefficient activities after the extension of credit.' 95 It should be
emphasized that this inefficiency is distinct from (and in addition to) the five
inefficiencies identified in Part V, which would arise even if each of the
activities of the borrower is value-increasing. Thus, a rule of partial priority
would have an additional advantage over full priority by facilitating fewer
undesirable activities.
To be sure, there is a special case in which the ability to transfer value
from nonadjusting creditors may permit the financing of an efficient activity.
That is the case in which the provision of additional financing to the borrower
would increase the value of nonadjusting creditors' claims. In such a case, the
efficiency gain from the financed activity may be less than the positive
externality conferred on nonadjusting creditors. If this is true, shareholders will
not be able to capture any of the efficiency benefits. As a result, they will not
undertake the activity unless a sufficient amount of value can be transferred
194. Cf. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1909 (arguing that reducing priority accorded to secured claims may
reduce level of undesirable activity).
195. See Hudson, supra note 27, at 49; Daniel E. Ingberman, Triggers and Priority: An Integrated
Model of the Effects of Bankruptcy Law on Overinvestment and Underinvestment, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341,
1372 (1994); White, supra note 27, at 552, 562-63 (arguing that according full priority to secured claims
may lead firm to undertake inefficient investments or to continue operating inefficiently when it should be
liquidated).
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back from the nonadjusting creditors to make the activity worthwhile for the
shareholders. It is possible that in such a situation, a full-priority rule would
transfer enough value to shareholders that they would undertake the efficient
activity-while a partial-priority rule would not.
To illustrate, suppose Firm is very likely to fail unless it receives
additional financing. Assume that, if Bank were to lend on an unsecured basis,
the additional financing would boost the value of nonadjusting claims by
$10,000 by increasing the probability that they will eventually be paid in full.
Assume further that the efficiency gain from undertaking the project is $7000.
Bank would charge an interest rate that compensates it for its risk of loss.
Thus, if Bank were to lend on an unsecured basis, $3000 of the increase in
value enjoyed by nonadjusting creditors would come at the expense of
shareholders who therefore would not undertake the efficient project. Now
suppose that under a partial-priority rule the additional financing would
increase nonadjusting claims by only $8000 (since, in the event of bankruptcy,
nonadjusting creditors would be worse off than under a pro rata rule). In such
a case, the shareholders would still not capture any of the efficiency gain and
thus would not undertake the efficient project. Suppose, however, that under
full priority the value of nonadjusting claims would increase only by $6000.
In such a case, shareholders would be able to enjoy $1000 of the efficiency
gain of the activity. As a result, they would have an incentive to pursue it.
Thus it is true that full priority may-in certain situations-facilitate
efficient activities that would not otherwise take place. However, these
situations will arise only when: (1) the activity to be financed would transfer
value to nonadjusting creditors; (2) the efficiency gain generated by the activity
would be less than the positive externality conferred on the nonadjusting
creditors; (3) the transfer of value from the nonadjusting creditors to the
shareholders will be sufficiently large under full priority to allow shareholders
to capture some of the efficiency gain; and (4) the transfer of value from the
nonadjusting creditors to the shareholders would not be sufficiently large under
the alternative partial-priority rule to allow shareholders to capture some of the
efficiency gain. Thus, it is believed that this type of situation is rather rare.196
Furthermore, when an efficient activity would otherwise not take place
under partial priority because it would confer too great a benefit on
nonadjusting creditors, those creditors may well find it in their interest to
modify their contractual rights in order to reduce the size of the positive
externality and permit the activity to take place. That is, when certain activities
will not be financed under partial priority because the equityholders would
capture too little of the benefit of the activities, the nonadjusting creditors
196. See, e.g., Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 23, at 248-49.
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might agree to reduce the size of their claims (by, for example, forgiving part
of their loans, subordinating their debt, or exchanging their debt for an equity
interest) in order to induce the equityholders to undertake the project. They
will be better off receiving full payment on their reduced claims than little or
no payment on their full claims. Indeed, lenders in workouts are routinely
observed agreeing to reduce the size of their claims, presumably in order to
increase the likelihood of ultimately receiving full payment on the balance of
their claims. 97
B. Some Relevant Empirical Evidence
Having examined the various costs and benefits associated with security
interests under full priority, we now take a look at the actual practices of
sophisticated creditors and their borrowers. Although we are currently living
in a de facto partial-priority regime, the behavior of sophisticated creditors and
borrowers may be able to shed some light on whether, when secured claims
are accorded priority, the use of security interests is generally efficient-that
is, whether the priority-independent and priority-dependent benefits of security
interests are generally greater than their priority-independent and priority-
dependent costs. In fact, the data suggest that, when priority is accorded to
secured claims in bankruptcy, the use of security interests is often inefficient.
The practices of sophisticated creditors and their borrowers thus tend to
support our view that a partial-priority rule may well be superior to the rule
of full priority from the perspective of efficiency.
Sophisticated creditors often do not incorporate security interests into their
loan agreements. 98 Their failure to do so provides evidence that, when
priority is accorded to secured claims in bankruptcy, the use of security
interests is frequently inefficient. As we saw in Part IV, the use of a security
interest permits a borrower to transfer bankruptcy value from nonadjusting
creditors. Thus, the failure to use a security interest implies that the efficiency
costs of the security interest that would have been borne by the borrower and
the sophisticated creditor would have been greater than the efficiency benefits
they would have enjoyed from the security interest plus the expected transfer
197. See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson et al., Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private
Reorganization of Finns in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 345-46 (1990).
198. The most direct evidence that sophisticated creditors do not always take security interests is that
many companies borrow from sophisticated creditors on an exclusively unsecured basis. See Leeth & Scott,
supra note 4, at 387 (reporting that only about 50% of small businesses with commercial bank loans in
study provided assets of the business as collateral); see also James R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans,
and the Cross-Monitoring Hypothesis, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 25, 40 n.10 (1992) (noting that few firms with
public unsecured debt borrow from banks on secured basis); LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1925 n.148
(reporting Federal Reserve statistics on lending by commercial banks to the effect that only 42.7% of $41.2
billion in short-term loans were secured and only 64.7% of $3.7 billion in long-term loans were secured).
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of bankruptcy value. This in turn suggests that the use of a security interest in
these cases would have been quite inefficient.'99
However, the most compelling evidence that the use of security interests
is often undesirable from the perspective of efficiency is the tremendously
widespread use of negative pledge covenants in loan agreements. 200 A
negative pledge covenant is a provision in a loan agreement that severely limits
the ability of a borrower to issue secured debt during the term of the loan.
Such a covenant imposes a cost on a borrower's owners by limiting the
borrower's ability-during the term of the loan-to offer another lender
priority in its assets in exchange for a lower interest rate. At the same time, a
negative pledge covenant provides a benefit to the unsecured lender by
preventing the borrower from engaging in various activities that will have the
effect of reducing the value of the lender's claim.
199. Although the current bankruptcy regime is one of de facto partial priority, see supra Section
VI.C, it still permits a borrower to transfer a significant amount of value from nonadjusting creditors by
issuing a security interest.
To be sure, the expected value of this transfer will be low if there is little likelihood that the borrower
will default. Thus, one might suggest that the borrowers with respect to which sophisticated lenders do not
take security interests are those that are the least likely to fail. If this were the case, the failure of a
sophisticated lender to use a security interest might demonstrate only that a security interest would have
been inefficient but not that the inefficiency would necessarily have been significant.
However, the widespread use of negative pledge covenants, see infra note 200, indicates that
sophisticated creditors do believe that even with respect to highly rated publicly traded firms, the risk of
failure is sufficiently high to make it worth negotiating for a contract that ensures that their claims will not
be subordinated in bankruptcy. Since the use of negative pledge covenants demonstrates creditors' concern
about their standing in bankruptcy, it stands to reason that these creditors would place some value on the
bankruptcy priority accorded by a security interest. Thus, the failure of a sophisticated creditor to use a
security interest in any given case suggests that the efficiency cost of using the security interest might have
been substantial.
Moreover, it is worth noting that a large portion of small firms-which are statistically more likely
to fail than larger firms, see Edward I. Altman et al., ZetaTM Analysis: A New Model to Identify Bankruptcy
Risk of Corporations, I J. BANKING & FIN. 29, 35-36 (1977) (reporting that bankruptcy risk decreases with
firm size); Leeth & Scott, supra note 4, at 392-borrow on a completely unsecured basis, see id. at 387
(reporting that almost 50% of small businesses in study do not provide business collateral for commercial
bank loans); Trends Tracked in Banking Practices of Small Businesses, J. Accr., Oct. 1987, at 36, 39
(reporting then-recent study indicating that 40% of small companies did not use any secured-credit
services). These data confirm that even when the value of priority might be relatively high, sophisticated
creditors and borrowers often find they are better off not using security interests, which strongly suggests
that the use of security interests is often inefficient.
200. See Morey W. McDaniel, Are Negative Pledge Clauses in Public Debt Issues Obsolete?, 38 Bus.
LAW. 867, 870-72 (1983). Negative pledge clauses are invariably incorporated into most unsecured term
loans originated by banks, insurance companies, and other institutional lenders. Id. at 872. There is also
widespread use of negative pledge clauses by publicly traded firms issuing unsecured debt. See MARCEL
KAHAN & BRUCE TUCKMAN, PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC LENDING: EVIDENCE FROM COVENANTS tbl. 2, at 9
(Harvard Law School Program in Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 151, 1995) (in sample of
privately placed debt issues, 100% of investment-grade issues and 95% of junk bond issues contained
limitations on issue of future security interests); Lehn & Poulsen. supra note 148 (reporting that 49.6% of
investment grade public bond issues and 46.1% of junk bond issues contained restrictions on ability of
borrower to issue secured debt). A recent study found, in a sample of public debt issues rated A or higher,
that over 90% of the issues restricted the borrower's ability to incur future secured debt. See Mai E.
Iskandar-Datta & Douglas R. Emery, An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Indenture Provisions in
Determining Bond Ratings, 18 J. BANKING & FIN. 93. 97-99 (1994). Indeed, a negative pledge clause is
the only restriction found in many debentures. McDaniel, supra. at 870.
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A negative pledge covenant would not be used unless it makes both the
borrower's shareholders and the unsecured lender better off. That is, the
covenant must benefit the unsecured lender more than it costs the borrower's
owners. Assuming that the unsecured lender and the borrower's owners were
the only parties affected by the arrangement, the use of such a covenant would
therefore indicate that it is efficient. Under these conditions, the use of the
covenant would imply that it would be inefficient to create the security
interests prohibited by its terms. The widespread use of these covenants would
in turn mean that security interests are often inefficient.
However, the unsecured lender and the borrower's owners are not the only
parties affected by the covenant. To the extent the borrower has other
unsecured creditors, these creditors-since they are in the same position as the
unsecured lender-will also derive benefit from the covenant. The share of the
benefit derived by each of the borrower's unsecured creditors-including the
unsecured lender that negotiated the covenant-will be in proportion to the size
of its claim. In other words, if the unsecured lender supplies 60% of the
borrower's unsecured credit, it will capture only 60% of the benefit of the
covenant. The remaining 40% of the benefit will flow to the borrower's other
unsecured creditors. As a result, one can infer from the use of a negative
pledge covenant not only that such a covenant is efficient, but also that it is
so efficient that just the share of the total benefit that is captured by the lender
is greater than the cost borne by the borrower's owners. Thus, the frequent use
of negative pledge covenants indicates that the creation of security interests is
often very inefficient.
To be sure, both the failure of many sophisticated creditors to use security
interests and the widespread use of negative pledge covenants in the United
States takes place under the current de facto rule of partial priority. As we
saw, certain efficiency benefits associated with security interests arise only to
the extent that secured claims are accorded priority in bankruptcy. These
efficiency benefits could, in theory, be significantly greater under a true full-
priority regime. The data thus cannot prove that the use of security interests
would be inefficient as frequently under a true full-priority regime.
We also saw, however, that there are significant inefficiencies that arise
when secured claims are accorded full priority in bankruptcy. These
inefficiencies would be greater under a true full-priority regime than they are
currently. Thus, the inference that can be drawn from current practices may
actually understate the extent to which the use of security interests would be
inefficient under a full-priority regime.
C. Enforcement of Partial Priority
Our analysis and the available data suggest that a rule of partial priority
may well be more efficient than the rule of full priority. We now turn to the
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question of whether an explicit partial-priority rule such as the ones we
propose could be enforced. There might be a number of ways in which a
secured creditor and a borrower might try to evade the effects of a partial-
priority rule. The specific options available to the secured creditor and the
borrower would of course largely depend on the circumstances of the parties.
Since most commercial secured debt in the United States is issued by small-
and medium-sized companies, we will focus on two strategies that those
borrowers and their secured creditors are likely to consider employing to evade
a partial-priority rule. Our conclusion will be that a partial-priority rule could
be made sufficiently effective to be worth adopting.
1. "Opting Out" of Bankruptcy
The most straightforward way for a secured creditor to evade a partial-
priority rule would be to avoid participating in a bankruptcy proceeding. A
secured creditor may seek to achieve this result either by seizing its collateral
before the borrower enters bankruptcy or by having the borrower liquidate
outside of bankruptcy.
Let us first assume that all failing firms eventually enter federal
bankruptcy. As we explained in Part VI, neither of the two rules we present
would affect a secured creditor's "repossessory right" or state-law "priority
right." Under either of these two rules, a secured creditor's "repossessory
right" and state-law "priority right" would remain intact while its secured claim
would be accorded only partial priority in bankruptcy. The secured creditor
will thus have an incentive to call a default and seize all of its collateral if it
anticipates that the debtor will enter bankruptcy in order to avoid "sharing" its
collateral with other creditors. If such a strategy were to succeed routinely,
secured creditors could put themselves beyond the reach of the bankruptcy
rules and undermine the efficiency benefits of using one of these partial-
priority rules in bankruptcy.
However, the possibility is rather small that a secured creditor will succeed
in "opting out" of partial priority by seizing its collateral before bankruptcy.
The secured creditor would not be able to repossess unless the contract gives
it the right, under the circumstances, to declare a default and seize the
collateral. And, even if the creditor has the right to declare a default under the
loan contract, its ability actually to seize the collateral will typically be limited.
In particular, the secured creditor could not seize the collateral if by doing so
it would breach the peace.2"' Since commercial collateral is typically located
on the borrower's property and cannot be accessed without its cooperation, this
breach-of-the-peace restriction renders it very difficult for secured creditors to
engage in "self-help" repossession from commercial borrowers. As a result, the
201. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1994).
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secured creditor will almost always be required to turn to ihe slower judicial
system in order to recover the collateral, providing the shareholders or the
borrower's unsecured creditors (both of which will generally be better off if
the borrower is in bankruptcy than if it is dismantled by the secured creditor
outside of bankruptcy 202 ) with ample time to file a bankruptcy petition.
More importantly, existing bankruptcy rules would generally make
repossession by a secured creditor on the eve of bankruptcy futile. For
example, section 547(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code gives the bankruptcy
trustee the right to void a transfer from the debtor to a creditor within ninety
days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition if the transfer would give the
creditor more than it would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.0 3 Indeed,
under current law, unsecured creditors often force a firm into bankruptcy after
the firm grants a security interest to another creditor, so that they can attack
the transfer of the security interest under section 547.2° Since secured
creditors are in principle entitled to the full value of their secured claims in
Chapter 7, this provision is currently not invoked against fully secured
creditors that receive payments from the debtor within ninety days of
bankruptcy. However, under a partial-priority rule, the secured creditor would
not be entitled to the full value of its claim in bankruptcy. Unsecured creditors
(or the borrower) might respond to a repossession by forcing the borrower into
bankruptcy within ninety days of the repossession and attacking the transfer
under section 547 so that the value of the collateral could be used, at least in
part, to satisfy their claims. Thus, even if a secured creditor could legally
repossess its collateral, it might be reluctant to incur the cost of repossession
knowing that unsecured creditors or the borrower would be likely to simply
undo the repossession simply by filing a bankruptcy petition and attacking the
transfer under section 547.205
We have seen that if all failing firms eventually entered federal
bankruptcy, existing or slightly modified rules would generally prevent secured
creditors from "opting out" of the bankruptcy proceedings. However, under
current law, failing firms are not required to enter bankruptcy. Indeed, there
are many firms that currently liquidate outside of bankruptcy. 0 6 Thus, even
if a partial-priority rule were adopted in bankruptcy, secured creditors whose
borrowers liquidate outside of bankruptcy would still be able to enjoy full
priority. The fact that many firms liquidate outside of bankruptcy might
202. Shareholders will generally be better off in bankruptcy because Chapter II holds out the
possibility that they will be able to retain an interest in the reorganized firm. See Bebchuk & Chang, supra
note 25, at 255. Unsecured creditors will prefer bankruptcy because under a de facto partial-priority rule
they will receive more than they would outside of bankruptcy.
203. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
204. See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1927.
205. The preference period for transfers to secured creditors could of course be extended to six months
or even one year if that were necessary to enforce a partial-priority rule.
206. See supra note 12.
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suggest that the effectiveness of a partial-priority rule in bankruptcy would be
quite limited.
One could of course require that every liquidating firm with unpaid debt
file a statement with the bankruptcy court listing its assets, transfers made
during the preceding year, and the identities of all of its unpaid creditors. A
court-appointed representative of the unsecured creditors or some other party
could then supervise the allocation of the debtor's assets so that it conforms
with the partial-priority rule in effect. Such a rule would completely eliminate
any problem that would be posed by out-of-bankruptcy liquidations.
However, even without mandatory bankruptcy filing, a partial-priority rule
in bankruptcy is likely to exert a significant influence on the behavior of
borrowers and their creditors outside of bankruptcy. First, unsecured creditors
with large enough claims will be able to threaten credibly to push a liquidating
borrower into bankruptcy if they do not receive an amount reflecting what they
would have received in bankruptcy under the partial-priority rule. Thus,
secured creditors and unsecured creditors will have an incentive to allocate a
liquidating borrower's assets outside bankruptcy in a way that mimics the
prevailing bankruptcy priority rule. Indeed, it is believed that currently many
firms liquidate outside of bankruptcy only after paying all of their debts or
after paying creditors what the creditors expect to receive in bankruptcy.20 7
Second, at the time a secured creditor extends credit, the creditor will not
know whether, if the borrower liquidates during the term of the loan, the
liquidation will take place inside or outside of bankruptcy, and, if the
liquidation takes place outside of bankruptcy, how much of the value of the
collateral the secured creditor will be required to give up. Thus, even if there
are cases where secured creditors are ultimately able to enjoy full priority
outside of bankruptcy when a borrower liquidates without paying all of its
debts, secured creditors will act as if they are in a partial-priority regime when
negotiating loan agreements with their borrowers. As a result, a partial-priority
rule in bankruptcy will tend to exert a desirable influence on the behavior of
commercial borrowers and their creditors when they contract even if there is
the possibility that the borrowers will liquidate outside of bankruptcy.
2. Using Lease Arrangements to Evade Partial Priority
Secured creditors may also seek to avoid a partial-priority rule by using
arrangements that are similar to secured loans but which accord them more
favorable treatment in bankruptcy. Indeed, a number of commentators have
suggested that secured creditors can thwart any attempt to give them less than
the full amount of their secured claims through the use of lease arrangements,
207. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 794 (1987).
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which can be functionally similar to secured loans but are currently not treated
as such in bankruptcy.20
8
In a sale-leaseback transaction, a firm sells assets to another party and then
leases them back. A standard lease agreement requires the firm to make
periodic payments on the lease to the lessor, and gives the lessor the right to
repossess the assets in the event of a default by the firm. At the termination
of a typical lease, the assets may be either returned to the lessor or purchased
by the firm. Depending on its terms, a lease may very closely resemble a
secured transaction. In both cases, the firm has use of an asset, agrees to make
a stream of payments to another party, and must relinquish possession of the
asset if it defaults on its obligations. 09
Under current bankruptcy law, leased assets are not property of the debtor
and therefore do not enter the bankruptcy estate,210 meaning that their value
is not available for distribution to creditors. Instead, the bankrupt firm may
either assume the lease (after curing any existing defaults), or reject the lease
and return the assets to the lessor.21' As a result, the lessor is assured of
receiving either the assets or the contract payments after the lessee enters
bankruptcy. In contrast, under a rule of partial priority, a secured creditor
would receive only a portion of the value of the assets serving as its collateral.
Although firms and their sophisticated creditors would appear to be able
to avoid partial priority by structuring secured transactions as leases, current
law already makes it somewhat difficult for an arrangement that functions like
a secured loan to be treated as a lease in bankruptcy. That is, bankruptcy law
may consider an arrangement a secured loan for bankruptcy purposes even if
it is labelled a "lease" by the two parties. There must be a real economic
difference between a lease arrangement and a secured loan for the arrangement
to be recognized as a lease under bankruptcy law.212 For example, the
arrangement must not make the lessee bear the cost of depreciation, and the
arrangement must terminate before the end of the asset's life.213
Thus, an arrangement that will be recognized as a lease in bankruptcy will
not be a perfect substitute for a secured loan. And, to the extent the lease is
in fact functionally different from a secured loan, it is likely to impose costs
on the parties that a secured loan would not. For example, because the lessee
does not bear the risk that the leased assets will fall in value by the end of the
208. See, e.g., White, supra note 17, at 503.
209. A sale-leaseback is similar to a secured transaction in which a firm encumbers an existing asset
to borrow cash. An ordinary lease is analogous to a purchase-money secured transaction in which the firm
acquires a new asset that serves as collateral for the purchase price. Our analysis does not distinguish
between these two types of lease arrangements.
210. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994). However, the lease contract itself enters the estate through this
provision.
211. See id. § 365.
212. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1994); White, Recent Erosion, supra note 23, at 420.
213. See White, Recent Erosion, supra note 23, at 420.
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lease term, it has less incentive to properly use and maintain them. The lessor
must thus impose restrictions on the assets' use and monitor the lessee's
compliance, an arrangement that would be costly for both parties214 whether
or not the lessee goes bankrupt. There are also other inherent costs to leasing.
For example, the lessor may be required to operate a facility for maintaining
and disposing the leased goods.
In addition, the current bankruptcy treatment of leases is not entirely
favorable for the lessor. If the lessee enters Chapter 11, there may be a
significant delay before the lessee rejects the lease and returns the assets to the
lessor.2 5 And, whether the lessee is in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, any damage
claims arising from the lessee's rejection will be treated as an unsecured claim
that arose before bankruptcy.2 6 Finally, a bankrupt lessee may be permitted
to assign the lease to another party over the lessor's objections." 7 Thus
under partial priority there would be many cases where the expected cost of
leasing is greater than the expected loss of lending on a secured basis; in those
cases, the parties would not substitute a lease for a secured loan.
However, let us assume that current law permitted leases structured
sufficiently like secured loans to be treated as leases in bankruptcy, and
therefore that secured creditors under current law could simply switch to
leasing to avoid the effect of a partial-priority rule. In such a case, the partial-
priority rule could easily be enforced by modifying the treatment of leases in
bankruptcy so that it was similar to that accorded secured loans. Indeed, to the
extent that leases are similar to secured loans, there would appear to be no
economic or other reason for treating the arrangements differently in
bankruptcy.2 1 8 Thus, there would appear to be little cost to affording lessors
less favorable treatment in bankruptcy if that were necessary to enforce a
partial-priority rule.
In fact, because both leases and secured loans give the lender or lessor
priority in bankruptcy, they are likely to give rise to the same types of
inefficiencies. Indeed, the covenants issued by public companies typically place
similar restrictions on borrowers with respect to both security interests and
leases,19 suggesting that the two arrangements do in fact have similar
undesirable efficiency consequences. Thus, according even less favorable
214. See generally Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & L. MacDonald Wakeman. Determinants of Corporate
Leasing Policy, 40 J. FIN. 895 (1985) (showing how various incentives explain use of contractual provisions
in corporate leases).
215. A lessee in Chapter 11 may be permitted to delay deciding whether to "reject" or "assume" the
lease until the end of the proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1994).
216. Id. § 365(g)(1).
217. Id. § 365(f).
218. Cf John D. Ayer, On the Vacuity of the Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 667 (1983)
(arguing that there is no justification for disparate treatment of leases and secured loans in bankruptcy since
two arrangements are essentially identical).
219. See McDaniel. supra note 200, at 867-68. Indeed, the only restrictions found in the debentures
of companies rated A or better are sale-leaseback restrictions and negative pledge covenants. Id. at 868.
[Vol. 105: 857
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy
treatment to the lessor in bankruptcy-for example, by allowing the bankruptcy
estate to reduce its lease payment obligations-might be desirable even if it
were not necessary to enforce partial priority.22
VIII. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE DESIRABILITY OF
PARTIAL PRIORITY
In this part, we consider other issues related to the desirability of adopting
a mandatory rule of partial priority. Section VIII.A explains that an
examination of the past behavior of U.S. firms is unlikely to indicate which
priority rule is most efficient. In Section VIII.B, we show that giving firms a
choice between partial priority and full priority is also unlikely to answer the
question of which rule is more efficient. Section VIII.C shows that full priority
is not required by bargain or fairness considerations. In Section VIII.D, we
demonstrate that full priority is also not mandated by freedom of contract
principles.
A. Learning from the Past Behavior of U.S. Firms
Our preliminary analysis of the possible efficiency costs of according less
than full priority to secured claims suggests that those costs-information-
acquisition costs, certain monitoring-coordination costs, and the loss from
efficient activities that cannot be financed-are likely to be relatively modest.
Indeed, some of the efficiency costs of partial priority may be necessary to
achieve even greater efficiency benefits. The additional information that
secured creditors are likely to acquire about their borrowers under partial
priority will permit better control of their borrowers' behavior after credit is
extended. And, while certain efficient activities that would have been financed
under full priority may not take place under partial priority, certain inefficient
activities may not take place as well.22" '
Since our analysis is preliminary and therefore cannot provide a definitive
answer to the question of which priority rule is superior, one might consider
investigating the actual behavior of firms to see if it could shed any light on
the issue. In particular, it might be hypothesized that if a particular partial-
priority rule were in fact more efficient than the full-priority rule, borrowers
would privately contract with their creditors to be bound by that partial-priority
220. The priority currently accorded to lessors in bankruptcy undoubtedly distorts the parties' choice
between efficient lending arrangements and less efficient leases. According less favorable treatment to
lessors would tend to reduce this distortion. For another possible benefit of according lessors less favorable
treatment in bankruptcy, see Jesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Breach Decisions in Bankruptcy 8
(Oct. 10, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting that reducing payments required of
bankrupt debtor under lease would reduce problem of inefficient breach in bankruptcy).
221. See supra Subsection VII.A.3.
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rule. Since firms are in fact not observed establishing private partial-priority
rule arrangements, one might be led to think that there is no rule of partial
priority that is more efficient than the rule of full priority.
. However, as we explained in Section VI.C, the de facto regime in which
U.S. firms operate is not one of full priority. As a result of the workings of
Chapter 11, secured creditors do not expect to receive, on average, the actual
value of their secured claims. Thus, a U.S. firm seeking to be governed by a
partial-priority rule would not need to opt out of U.S. bankruptcy law.
More importantly, firms do not have the ability to opt out of U.S.
bankruptcy law; the bankruptcy rules are mandatory.222 Thus, even if a firm
preferred to be governed by another rule (i.e., another partial-priority rule or
a true full-priority rule), it could not choose such a regime. Consequently, the
failure to observe firms opting out of U.S. bankruptcy law cannot be used as
evidence for or against the efficiency of any particular rule.
B. Leaving the Priority Rule to Private Ordering
One might propose that U.S. firms be allowed to choose to be governed
by either a full-priority or a partial-priority rule. Such an arrangement would
appear to eliminate the need to determine the relative efficiency of the two
rules, since each firm would presumably choose the regime that was most
efficient given its particular circumstances.
However, if a firm were given the choice between a full- and a partial-
priority regime, it is unlikely that it would choose the partial-priority regime
even if that regime were more efficient. As explained, involuntary creditors,
and in particular government agencies, are likely to have significant claims
against the firm when it goes bankrupt. These creditors would not adjust the
size of their claims against the firm to take into account the priority regime
chosen by the firm. Thus, if the firm were to choose a partial-priority regime,
secured creditors would demand higher interest rates, but involuntary creditors
would not reduce the size of their claims (even though they would be better
off). Unless the efficiency advantage of partial priority over full priority were
greater than the value transferred from involuntary creditors by such a move,
the firm would not have an incentive to choose partial priority.2
23
Even in the absence of involuntary creditors, a firm would choose a more
efficient partial-priority regime only if it expected its voluntary unsecured
creditors to charge lower interest rates than they would under a full-priority
222. See. e.g., United States v. Royal Business Funds Corp.. 724 F2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing
general rule that debtor may not agree to waive right to file bankruptcy petition): Rasmussen. supra note
32, at 61 n.28 (describing inability of firm to contract around Chapter II provisions).
223. Cf Rasmussen. supra note 32, at 67 (observing that firms permitted to choose among bankruptcy
regimes will have incentive to choose the one that assigns lowest possible priority to nonconsensual
claimants).
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regime and thus compensate the firm for the higher rates that would be
demanded by secured creditors. To induce voluntary unsecured creditors to
lower their interest rates, it would be necessary for the firm to notify its
creditors, including those with small claims, that the firm was a "partial-
priority rule" firm rather than a "full-priority rule" firm.
However, notifying voluntary unsecured creditors-including such creditors
as utilities and trade suppliers-is unlikely to be sufficient to induce creditors
to calibrate their interest rates to the particular priority regime chosen by the
firm. Trade suppliers currently charge uniform interest rates to all of their
customers, indicating that they do not take into account the particular
characteristics of each borrower. Given that the likelihood that any particular
firm will go bankrupt is very small, that an individual trade supplier's
bankruptcy payment may not differ much (in absolute terms) under a full-
priority and a partial-priority rule, and that the trade supplier's customers will
differ considerably along many other dimensions that affect the creditor's risk
of loss, there is no reason to believe that a creditor would take into account the
priority rule in determining the interest rate. Instead, creditors with small
claims could be expected to continue charging a single interest rate calculated
to compensate them for the aggregate risk they face in lending to many
different types of firms.224 As a result, firms might have little incentive to
choose an efficient partial-priority regime even in a world with no involuntary
creditors.
Given the expectation that even many voluntary creditors will not adjust
the interest rate they charge to reflect the priority regime chosen by firms,
allowing firms to choose between partial priority and full priority is unlikely
to answer the question of which rule is socially optimal since their choice will
be distorted in favor of full priority. This analysis further suggests that since
firms may choose a full-priority regime over a partial-priority regime even if
the partial-priority regime were more efficient, a partial-priority rule should be
made mandatory rather than optional if it is believed to be the most efficient
rule.
C. Fairness and Bargain Considerations
Our analysis thus far has focused on the rules of full and partial priority
primarily from an efficiency perspective. From this perspective, we have
shown that a rule of partial priority may well be preferable to the rule of full
priority. But, before closing, it is worth considering whether some other
normative principle can be seen as requiring the rule of full priority.
224. Cf. Baird, supra note 106. at 2259 (observing that transaction costs of informing trade creditors,
who generally charge uniform interest rates to all customers, that a particular borrower had amended its
charter to create optimal financial structure would likely make such change not worthwhile).
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One might take the position that giving a secured claim less than full
priority in bankruptcy is inconsistent with the bargain that the secured creditor
makes with the borrower and is thus unfair. In particular, one might argue that
since the secured creditor had contracted for full priority and had chosen its
terms accordingly, that priority should be respected consistently by the law.
Indeed, the legislative history of the current U.S. Bankruptcy Code states
explicitly that it was the intent of the U.S. Senate, in drafting the bankruptcy
laws, to give secured creditors the benefit of their bargains.2
However, the fairness or bargain argument for according full priority to
secured claims in bankruptcy is less valid than it may appear at first glance.
Under a partial-priority regime, creditors taking security interests would expect
partial-priority treatment in bankruptcy (not full priority) and choose their
terms accordingly. Providing them with only partial priority in the end would
therefore be perfectly consistent with their initial bargain. That is, if a
borrower of a secured creditor were to enter bankruptcy, the secured creditor
would get no more and no less than it expected to receive in such an
event.226 Indeed, given that the de facto regime has been one of less than full
priority for some time, it is reasonable to assume that secured creditors
currently expect to receive on average less than full priority for their secured
claims in bankruptcy and set their terms to reflect that expectation. When a
borrower enters Chapter 11 and a secured creditor receives less than the actual
value of its secured claim, that secured creditor therefore cannot claim that it
was treated unfairly.
Finally, it is worth noting that the transition to an explicit partial-priority
rule need not deny secured creditors the benefit of the bargains they entered
into before the change of regime. If necessary, the rule could be applied only
prospectively. Of course, if the partial-priority rule adopted accorded as much
priority to secured claims as those claims receive today under the de facto
partial-priority regime, secured creditors that had extended credit before the
change of regime would receive the benefit of their bargains.227
D. Freedom of Contract Concerns
Even if one believed that the adoption of a rule according partial priority
to secured claims was not foreclosed by bargain or fairness considerations, one
might still raise the objection that such a rule constrains freedom of contract.
225. See supra note 14.
226. Cf Rogers, supra note 8, at 986-87 (arguing that Fifth Amendment takings doctrine does not
apply to secured creditor whose state-law rights are modified in bankruptcy, because at time of entering
arrangement secured creditor knew or should have known that its rights were circumscribed by federal
bankruptcy law).
227. In contrast, if all existing debt were suddenly to become subject to a true full-priority regime,
current secured creditors would get a windfall, and current unsecured creditors would not get the benefit
for which they had bargained.
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In particular, one might argue that a partial-priority rule denies a borrower the
right to grant a creditor a security interest giving the creditor full priority in
the collateral under all circumstances. Indeed, the rule of full priority has been
defended on just this ground.228
However, freedom of contract arguments have force only with respect to
arrangements that do not create direct externalities. When a contract directly
affects only the parties to that arrangement, in most cases it is believed that the
parties should be allowed to choose for themselves whatever is best for them.
But when the contract directly impinges on the rights of third parties, there is
no prima facie presumption of freedom of contract.229
When an insolvent debtor enters bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court cannot
enforce all of the contracts the debtor entered into before it defaulted; the
assets available are simply insufficient to make this possible. As a result, the
bankruptcy system must modify the debtor's loan contracts by limiting the
extent to which each creditor is entitled to repayment. This is generally
accomplished by giving each creditor a right to its pro rata share of the
debtor's bankruptcy assets.230 In this setting, an arrangement between the
debtor and a particular creditor that gives the creditor more than its pro rata
share of the debtor's bankruptcy assets must therefore reduce, dollar-for-dollar,
the amount that will be available to other creditors-that is, such an
arrangement creates a direct externality on these other creditors.
Since an arrangement that allows the debtor to increase the bankruptcy
share of one party must come at the expense of another, it is only natural that
the law imposes restrictions on the ability of a debtor to enter into such
arrangements. For example, a firm may not sell options on its bankruptcy value
to noncreditors.23' The law also does not allow a debtor to favor some
creditors at the expense of others by making preferential payments on the eve
of bankruptcy. 2 Nor, as we observed in Part II, does the law give any force
to a contractual term between a debtor and unsecured creditor C, giving that
unsecured creditor's claim priority over the claim of unsecured creditor C2 in
bankruptcy. The refusal of the law to enforce the sale of C2's bankruptcy value
to C, does not generally raise freedom of contract concerns because it is
recognized that the debtor's sale of C2's bankruptcy value to C, concerns the
disposition of something of value that does not belong to either of them, but
rather to C2.233 It would be no more natural for the law to enforce such a
228. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 8, at 2049-53.
229. Cf. Schwartz, Taking, supra note 23, at 2082 (arguing that contractual arrangement is considered
presumptively desirable only if there are no externalities).
230. For discussions of the pro rata rule, see JACKSON, supra note 30. at 29-32; Kanda & Levmore,
supra note 23. at 2122.
231. Cf. Buckley, supra note 23, at 1456-58 (questioning policy bases for prohibition of sales of
bankruptcy value to noncreditors).
232. See II U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
233. See LoPucki, supra note 8. at 1899 & n.52.
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contract than it would be to enforce a contract in which the debtor sells C2's
house to C,.
However, under the rule of full priority, the creation of a security interest
by a debtor in favor of C, accomplishes the same result as a contract between
the debtor and C, that gives C,'s claim priority over C2's claim. A security
interest under full priority thus creates the same direct externality as a simple
contract between the debtor and C, that the law would refuse to enforce.2 '34
Freedom of contract no more requires that the debtor and C, be permitted to
create a security interest subordinating C2's claim than it requires that the law
enforce a simple contract between C, and the debtor achieving the same result.
Thus, while it may be desirable from an efficiency standpoint to fully or
partially respect the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy, such a result is
certainly not mandated by freedom of contract principles.
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article has reexamined a basic principle of bankruptcy law-that
secured claims should be accorded full priority over unsecured claims. We
have taken issue with the view widely held by legal scholars and economists
that economic efficiency is best served by giving secured claims full priority
in bankruptcy. Our analysis has demonstrated that the rule of full priority in
fact creates distortions in the contractual arrangements between commercial
borrowers and their creditors, producing various efficiency costs. In particular,
the Article has shown that full priority causes excessive use of security
interests, reduces the incentive of firms to take adequate precautions and
choose appropriate investments, and distorts the monitoring arrangements
chosen by firms and their creditors.
Having identified the efficiency costs associated with full priority, we also
have considered the desirability of a different approach-according only partial
priority to secured claims. Our analysis of partial priority has shown that such
a rule could eliminate or reduce these efficiency costs-and that such an
approach may well be more efficient than the full-priority rule. Therefore, we
have put forward two particular partial-priority rules-the adjustable-priority
rule and the fixed-fraction priority rule-that should be considered as
alternatives to the rule of full priority. Our analysis has also shown that a
partial-priority rule should not be left to private ordering, could be feasibly
implemented, and would be consistent with considerations of fairness and
contractual freedom. We hope that our work will lead bankruptcy scholars to
reconsider the principle of full priority, and that the framework of analysis we
have developed will prove valuable in this effort.
234. See Schwartz, Taking, supra note 23. at 2082.
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